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DON’T JUST DO SOMETHING!:  E-HEARSAY, 
THE PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION, AND 
THE CASE FOR CAUTION IN THE 
RULEMAKING PROCESS 
LIESA L. RICHTER∗ 
This Article weighs in on the cutting-edge debate regarding the effects of electronic 
hearsay or “e-hearsay” on the truth-seeking function of the trial process.  Professor 
Jeffrey Bellin recently raised an urgent call to revise the present sense impression 
exception to the hearsay rule as a result of the explosion of hearsay on-line, 
recommending a “percipient witness” amendment to the rule. This Article responds to 
Professor Bellin and argues that a “percipient witness” requirement is not only 
unnecessary, but potentially deleterious to the goal of a rational and fair trial system to 
achieve accurate fact-finding. 
While e-hearsay may be dressed up in contemporary vernacular and preserved in a 
novel format, it remains human communication.  This Article argues that, because 
existing hearsay doctrine was designed to deal with human communication with all of 
its frailties and idiosyncrasies in whatever form it may take, amendments to account 
for e-hearsay are unnecessary.  Further, this Article highlights the overlooked benefits of 
electronic present sense impressions to the trial process, particularly in the domestic 
violence context, where critical victim hearsay within other exceptions is now excluded 
by the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Crawford v. 
Washington and its progeny.  This Article urges confidence in the ability of trial 
judges to regulate the latest installment in ever-evolving platforms of communication 
and counsels restraint in the rulemaking process. 
                                                 
 ∗  Thomas P. Hester Presidential Professor, University of Oklahoma College of 
Law. I would like to thank Thomas P. Hester and his family for their generous 
support, which helped to make this article possible.  I would also like to extend a 
special thanks to Dan Capra, Katheleen Guzman, Emily Meazell, Tom O’Neil, and 
Mike Seigel for taking the time to read prior drafts of this article and for many 
helpful comments.  Finally, I would like to thank Professor Jeffrey Bellin for starting 
a truly fascinating conversation regarding hearsay in the age of the tweet.   
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Finally, should trial courts demonstrably fail to regulate e-hearsay under existing 
rules when given the opportunity, this article outlines four potential alternatives to a 
“percipient witness” requirement that would preserve valuable evidence and be 
consistent with the goal of the Federal Rules of Evidence to ascertain “the truth and 
secur[e] a just determination.” 
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“Don’t just do something—stand there!”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The last two decades have seen an explosion of technology into 
everyday existence.  Ordinary citizens, including small children, walk 
around with hand-held devices that possess wireless capabilities 
reminiscent of Star Trek episodes of the late 1960s.2  This 
technological revolution has enormous implications in multiple legal 
contexts, including criminal enterprise and its investigation, privacy, 
free speech, trademark, personal jurisdiction, and discovery, to name 
but a few.3  In the past decade, legal scholars, practitioners, and 
legislators have launched a multitude of projects designed to reform 
existing legal standards to meet contemporary technological 
realities.4  Predictably, academic journals are filled with proposed 
revisions to traditional legal rules and policies to accommodate swiftly 
advancing technology and communication norms.5   
                                                 
 1. See ALICE IN WONDERLAND (Walt Disney Pictures 1951) (spoken by the white 
rabbit); see also THE EXECUTIVE’S BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 94 (Julia Vitullo-Martin & J. 
Robert Moskin, eds., 1994) (attributing quotation to George P. Shultz, former 
Secretary of State). 
 2. See David Allen Batchelor, The Science of Star Trek, NASA, 
http://www.nasa.gov/topics/technology/features/star_trek.html (last visited July 11, 
2012) (discussing the technology Star Trek writers created to use in the show and its 
popularity in modern culture). 
 3. See, e.g., United State v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that attachment 
of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle constitutes a search and seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 
2780, 2791 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the 
contemporary problem of personal jurisdiction in the Internet age). 
 4. See, e.g., David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels:  An Empirical 
Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 409–10 (2010) (describing provisions and purposes of 
Communications Decency Act Internet immunity); Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery & 
Beyond:  Toward a Brave New World or 1984?, 25 REV. LITIG. 633, 647–59 (2006) 
(discussing amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to account for 
electronic discovery); Christopher G. Clark, Note, The Truth in Domain Names Act of 
2003 and a Preventative Measure to Combat Typosquatting, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 
1505–07 (2004) (describing the Truth in Domain Names Act of 2003). 
 5. See generally David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet 
Economy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1987 (2008) (discussing the lack of law to govern 
businesses with “multi-sided platforms”); Mitchell P. Goldstein, Congress and the 
Courts Battle Over the First Amendment:  Can the Law Really Protect Children from 
Pornography on the Internet?, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 141 (2003) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court should clearly define its test for obscenity); Michael 
J. Madison, The Narratives of Cyberspace Law (or, Learning from Casablanca), 27 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 249 (2004) (discussing how the Internet lacks the material characteristics 
that define traditional copyright law); Robert K. Magovern, Comment, The Expert 
Agency and the Public Interest:  Why the Department of Justice Should Leave Online Obscenity 
to the FCC, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 327 (2003) (positing that the FCC and 
Department of Justice should create and enforce regulations of obscenity on the 
Internet). 
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While amending rules and policies to keep pace with technology 
undoubtedly can be necessary, legal reformers should be wary of 
change for its own sake.  Not all legal standards are similarly 
susceptible to changing cultural and communication media, and 
some circumspection is in order.  Without careful analysis, rapid 
changes to first legal principles to address ongoing technological 
progress may usher in unintended negative consequences and serve 
to undermine long-standing legal standards of continuing 
significance.  Further, such revisions may provide few long-term 
solutions as a result of the moving technological target they seek to 
hit.  This Article will sound a cautionary note amid the clamor for 
change by highlighting the dangers of hasty revision of long-standing 
legal standards and illustrating the benefits of allowing such 
standards to evolve with technology in some instances. 
This Article will examine the dangers of overreaction and the 
benefits of patience in connection with a recent proposal to amend 
the evidentiary hearsay doctrine to accommodate the technological 
transformation of communities through social media websites.6  
Because technology has dramatically altered the methods by which 
humans communicate, commentators are concerned about the 
potential impact on the hearsay doctrine, which limits the 
admissibility of human assertions made outside the courtroom.  
Technology promises to preserve voluminous hearsay evidence 
heretofore lost to the trial process.  In fact, there is some indication 
that the current culture of online social media not only preserves 
hearsay information, but may also promote the creation of previously 
non-existent electronic hearsay or “e-hearsay” evidence.  In the era of 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, communication norms now 
contemplate the constant online posting and texting of real-time 
information about activities, events, thoughts, emotions, and 
observations.  Courts and litigants will be forced to adapt existing 
doctrine to regulate the admissibility of this e-hearsay or develop new 
standards to control its flow into the courtroom. 
One hearsay exception that has come under fire as ill-suited to the 
current communication climate is the exception for the present sense 
impression.7  The present sense impression exception, which is 
recognized by the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as by the 
majority of states, permits admission of a hearsay statement that 
describes or explains an event or condition while, or immediately 
                                                 
 6. See Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present Sense 
Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 337–38 (2012).  
 7. Id. 
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after, the speaker perceives that event or condition.8  The exception 
is currently listed prominently as the first hearsay exception in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803.9  Before its adoption in the Federal 
Rules, however, the present sense impression exception was subject to 
great debate, characterized by common law rejection, judicial 
resistance, and scholarly disagreement as to its merits.10   
In light of the constant stream of observations, descriptions, and 
commentary on social media websites, Professor Jeffrey Bellin 
recently urged amendment of the present sense impression 
exception to prevent the free flow of social media e-hearsay into the 
trial process.11  Due to the inherent unreliability of tweets, texts, 
status updates, and other e-hearsay, Professor Bellin recommends 
adding a “percipient witness” requirement as a condition of 
admissibility for present sense impression evidence.12  This revision to 
the present sense impression exception would exclude such hearsay 
from the trial process in the absence of a testifying witness capable of 
corroborating the events it describes. 
This Article argues that a percipient witness proposal should be 
rejected.  First and foremost, amending the present sense impression 
exception to account for the rise of e-hearsay is unnecessary.  E-
hearsay may be dressed up in contemporary vernacular and preserved 
in a novel format, but it remains human communication.  Existing 
hearsay doctrine was designed to deal with human communication 
with all of its frailties and idiosyncrasies in whatever form it may 
take.13  The creation and preservation of hearsay in electronic form, 
therefore, provides no basis for charging in to refashion time-
honored hearsay principles.  E-hearsay is simply a convenient and 
modern platform from which to launch the same assault on the 
present sense impression that has plagued the hearsay exception 
from its inception. 
Furthermore, adding a percipient witness requirement to the 
present sense impression exception would damage the trial process 
                                                 
 8. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See generally, Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Resurrect the Present Sense 
Impression Hearsay Exception:  A Relapse in Hearsay Policy, 52 HOW. L.J. 319 (2009) 
(describing the history of the present sense impression, as well as judicial and 
scholarly rejection of the exception). 
 11. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 338 (suggesting that “courts and legislatures 
update the present sense impression exception by requiring corroboration by a 
percipient witness as a prerequisite to admission”).   
 12. Id.  
 13. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (defining a “statement” for purposes of hearsay as a 
“person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or non-verbal conduct, if the person 
intended it as an assertion”). 
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by eliminating relevant and reliable evidence.  This Article will 
analyze the overlooked potential benefit of previously unavailable 
texts, tweets and status updates to the truth-seeking process, 
particularly in the domestic violence context where such e-hearsay 
can be expected to serve a critical role following the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s landmark decision in Crawford v. Washington.14  The Federal 
Rules of Evidence are designed to “ascertain[] the truth and secur[e] 
a just determination.”15  The availability of contemporaneous 
information regarding disputed events promises to advance the 
important goal of generating accurate trial outcomes. 
Finally, because e-hearsay represents nothing fundamentally new in 
the communication landscape, trial judges can be expected to rise to 
the e-hearsay challenge and control the flow of electronic or “e”-
present sense impressions into court using existing standards.  In 
keeping with the strong common law tradition that is the backbone 
of the law of evidence, trial judges should, at a minimum, be afforded 
the opportunity to try—before rule-makers act—to protect the trial 
process from potentially improvident e-hearsay admission.  Should 
there be a documented failure to regulate e-hearsay using existing 
requirements of the present sense impression, rule-makers could act, 
armed with a record to support potential modifications to the hearsay 
exception.  Even then, the addition of a percipient witness 
requirement would be akin to prescribing decapitation to cure a 
headache.  Such an amendment would largely undermine the utility 
of the present sense impression as a source of helpful information.  If 
revision is pursued, rule-makers should first explore less draconian 
amendments that are more consistent with evidentiary policy. 
Part I of this Article briefly describes the history of the present 
sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, as well as its existing 
requirements under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1).  Part I 
highlights the significant protections against the admission of wholly 
unsupported e-hearsay statements within the current framework of 
the Federal Rules.  In addition, Part I reviews judicial treatment of 
the present sense impression, revealing a cautious and thoughtful 
approach to present sense impressions that promises to extend into 
the e-hearsay arena. 
Part II of this piece explores the present sense impression in the 
context of the Supreme Court’s recent Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence outlined in Crawford v. Washington and its progeny.  As 
                                                 
 14. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 15. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
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scholars have thoroughly documented, the Crawford paradigm 
excludes a substantial amount of “testimonial” hearsay evidence 
previously utilized in the context of domestic violence prosecutions, 
where victims routinely fail to appear at trial for cross-examination.16  
In the wake of Crawford, the present sense impression exception 
appears to be a significant source of constitutionally permissible 
“nontestimonial” hearsay.  Part II demonstrates that revision of the 
present sense impression exception to add a percipient witness 
requirement threatens to close the door on this last source of 
evidence to protect victims of domestic violence.  Part II concludes 
that allowing trial judges to utilize existing limitations on the 
admissibility of present sense impressions under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence may provide the best balance between the interests of 
criminal defendants and those of crime victims. 
Part III of this Article articulates concerns regarding the timing, 
scope, and substance of any proposed amendment to the present 
sense impression exception to account for shifting norms of 
communication.  Part III counsels against piecemeal amendment of 
individual hearsay exceptions in response to the e-hearsay explosion.  
To the extent that rule-makers perceive an urgent need to amend the 
present sense impression exception to account for e-hearsay, 
however, Part III argues that the proposed percipient witness 
requirement would largely eliminate the utility of present sense 
impressions by admitting them only when they are duplicative of live 
testimony.  Part III also highlights the difficult interpretive issues that 
would be injected into the present sense impression by a percipient 
witness requirement.  Finally, Part III proposes four potential 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence that would better serve 
the policy underlying the present sense impression exception and the 
Rules generally, as alternatives to a stifling percipient witness 
requirement. 
I. THE PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION EXCEPTION:  THEN AND NOW 
Federal Rule of Evidence 802 prohibits the admission of hearsay 
                                                 
 16. See, e.g., Clifford S. Fishman, Confrontation, Forfeiture and Giles v. California:  
An Interim User’s Guide, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 703 (2009) (observing that although 
Crawford did not involve the prosecution of domestic violence, the arresting impact 
the majority decision would have on testimony sought to be introduced at such 
prosecutions was “obvious”); Aviva Orenstein, Sex, Threats, and Absent Victims:  The 
Lessons of Regina v. Bedingfield for Modern Confrontation and Domestic Violence Cases, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 115, 115 (2010) (proffering that the Crawford majority’s 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause “profoundly affected domestic violence 
cases, making it much harder to prosecute them successfully”). 
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statements in federal trials unless an enumerated hearsay exception 
applies to the particular out of court assertion at issue.17  In so doing, 
Rule 802 continues the long-standing common law rejection of 
hearsay evidence of questionable reliability and insists upon in-court 
testimony under oath subject to contemporaneous cross-examination 
by witnesses with first-hand knowledge of events they describe.18  The 
Federal Rules of Evidence provide numerous exceptions to the ban 
on hearsay evidence based upon notions of fairness, necessity, and 
reliability.19  The hearsay exception allowing the admission of present 
sense impressions is contained within Federal Rule of Evidence 803.20  
The Rule 803 hearsay exceptions apply regardless of whether the 
declarant testifies at trial and, indeed, regardless of whether the 
declarant is available for trial.21 
A. The Contours of the Contemporary Present Sense Impression 
Present sense impressions are hearsay statements that explain or 
describe an event or condition made while the speaker perceives that 
very event or condition or “immediately thereafter.”22  Because the 
hearsay statement is uttered contemporaneously with the observation 
or immediately thereafter, such a statement is free from significant 
concerns of failed memory—one of the pivotal concerns underlying 
the hearsay doctrine.23  Further, the lack of time for reflection 
between observation and speech also lends to the statement’s 
perceived freedom from risks of deliberate insincerity.24  By 
definition, the speaker must have personal knowledge of the event or 
                                                 
 17. FED. R. EVID. 802. 
 18. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII introductory note (offering that the requirement 
that a testifying witness be present, under oath, and subject to cross examination, 
evolved from the notion that a witness’s value is derived from her “perception,” 
“memory,” “narration,” and “sincerity” (citing Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers 
and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948))).  This 
preference for live testimony finds support in the Constitution to the extent that 
evidence is admitted against a criminal defendant.  The Sixth Amendment preserves 
the right of the accused to confront his accusers, and thus limits the admission of 
hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant.  541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). 
 19. See 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
8:31 (3d ed. 2007). 
 20. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See United States v. Brewer, 36 F.3d 266, 272 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Statements of 
present sense impression are considered reliable because the immediacy eliminates 
the concern for lack of memory and precludes time for intentional deception.” 
(quoting 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 438 
(1980) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 24. See id. at 271–72. 
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condition described as well.25  Based upon these factors and 
philosophies, the present sense impression is listed as the first 
exception to the hearsay rule in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1).26 
B. The Checkered Past of the Present Sense Impression 
While the present sense impression enjoys a position of 
prominence as the first enumerated hearsay exception in Rule 803, it 
is a relative newcomer to the hearsay landscape.  Throughout the 
evolution of the hearsay doctrine, distinguished evidence scholars 
have disagreed sharply over the viability of the present sense 
impression.27  As a result, the exception struggled for recognition and 
did not gain widespread acceptance in federal or state courts until 
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.28 
James Bradley Thayer, the most influential evidentiary scholar of 
the nineteenth century,29 first extracted the concept of the present 
sense impression from the doctrine of res gestae.30  Thayer 
emphasized the importance of the timing of the hearsay statement 
and concluded that substantial contemporaneity between the event 
perceived and the declarant’s description were sufficient to justify an 
exception to the hearsay rule.31  Indeed, Thayer postulated that 
present sense impressions were more accurate than traditionally 
accepted excited utterances.32  He theorized that excitement can, in 
fact, decrease a declarant’s ability to perceive and narrate events with 
accuracy, thus diminishing the reliability of excited utterances.33  In 
contrast, the declarant’s description of the more mundane events 
envisioned by the present sense impression is less susceptible to such 
concerns.34  Moreover, Thayer noted motivational concerns in the 
context of excited utterances, where the required excitement in the 
                                                 
 25. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (“In a hearsay situation, the 
declarant is, of course, a witness, and neither this rule nor Rule 804 dispenses with 
the requirement of firsthand knowledge.”). 
 26. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 27. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 326–29 (describing the conflict between 
Thayer’s support for the present sense impression exception and Wigmore’s 
rejection of it, and noting subsequent criticism of the present sense impression by 
both scholars and courts across the country). 
 28. Id. at 329 (finding “massive judicial rejection of the present sense impression 
exception”). 
 29. Jay Hoor, A Brief Life of James Bradley Thayer, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993). 
 30. See James B. Thayer, Bedingfield’s Case—Declarations as a Part of the Res Gestae, 
15 AM. L. REV. 71 (1881) (arguing for an exception to the rule against hearsay for 
declarations made contemporaneous with the fact under investigation).   
 31. Id. at 80–81. 
 32. Id. at 83. 
 33. Id. at 84–86. 
 34. Id. at 82–83. 
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declarant is produced by a startling event that becomes the subject of 
later litigation.35  Because the present sense impression may describe 
more  commonplace events as they unfold, the declarant may be 
unlikely to recognize the potential importance of the event at the 
time, further diminishing any incentive to deceive.36  Therefore, 
Thayer proposed recognizing the present sense impression in 
addition to the well-accepted excited utterance exception to the 
hearsay rule.37 
Due to common communication methodology in the late 
nineteenth century, Thayer’s formulation of the present sense 
impression presupposed an oral hearsay statement  regarding an 
unfolding event.38  Accordingly, Thayer anticipated that present sense 
impressions would be introduced at trial by a witness who had 
overheard an oral present sense impression uttered by another.39  In 
the typical case, a trial witness in a position to overhear an oral 
description of an ongoing event would have had a similar 
opportunity to observe the described event and be in a position to 
corroborate the hearsay statement at trial.40  Later scholars favoring 
adoption of the present sense impression similarly presumed that 
such testimonial corroboration by a percipient witness would exist.41  
Although Thayer recognized the likely presence of such 
corroboration, he did not articulate “corroboration” of the statement 
as an independent requirement for the admission of the present 
sense impression.42  Because of Thayer’s significant influence, the 
concept of the present sense impression enjoyed some acceptance 
                                                 
 35. Id. at 105–06. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 82–83. 
 38. Id. at 83. 
 39. Id. at 107. 
 40. See id. at 107 (explaining that present sense impressions would describe 
“what was then present or but just gone by, and so was open, either immediately or 
in the indications of it, to the observation of the witness who testifies to the 
declaration, and who can be cross-examined as to these indications”). 
 41. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of 
Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 439 (1928) (“With emotion absent, speed present, 
and the person who heard the declaration on hand to be cross-examined, we appear 
to have an ideal exception to the hearsay rule.”); Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested 
Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 236 (1922) 
(explaining that “the event is open to perception by the senses of the person to 
whom the declaration is made and by whom it is usually reported on the witness 
stand” and that “[t]he witness is subject to cross-examination concerning that event 
as well as the fact and content of the utterance, so that the extra-judicial statement 
does not depend solely upon the credit of the declarant”). 
 42. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 354 (noting that early proponents of the 
present sense impression assume the presence of corroboration by definition, 
without advocating it as an independent requirement). 
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among the judiciary during the late nineteenth century.43 
“If Thayer was the . . . champion [of the present sense impression], 
Wigmore was its nemesis.”44  Thayer’s protégé, John Henry Wigmore, 
assumed prominence for much of the twentieth century and his views 
of the proper scope and focus of the hearsay doctrine soon 
dominated the evidentiary sphere.45  In contrast to Thayer, Wigmore 
emphasized the need for stress or excitement to create assurances of 
declarant sincerity.46  According to Wigmore, present sense 
impressions lacking elements of excitement were likewise lacking in 
needed reliability.47  Wigmore, thus, steadfastly rejected a hearsay 
exception for the present sense impression.48  Although many 
academics continued to support Thayer’s approach to the exception, 
courts creating the common law of evidence at the time followed 
Wigmore’s approach and refused to recognize the present sense 
impression.49 
In this common law climate, the drafters of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence considered the fate of the present sense impression.50  By 
the 1970s when the Advisory Committee was drafting the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, research regarding testimonial accuracy and 
memory had proliferated.51  Commentators were increasingly 
concerned with the significant risks of failed memory and testimonial 
error, in addition to risks of intentional insincerity.52  In keeping with 
these contemporary concerns, the Advisory Committee went against 
                                                 
 43. Id. at 327 (stating that “before Wigmore’s intervention, ‘[t]he exception to 
the hearsay rule for spontaneous exclamations in the absence of a startling event 
ha[d] been accepted by the courts fairly extensively when the statement relate[d] to 
an event.’” (alteration in original)). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. (explaining that “Wigmore, ‘Thayer’s most distinguished disciple,’ 
enjoyed the greatest stature in the field” (citation omitted)). 
 46. See, 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1747, at 
195 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) (stating that “under certain external circumstances of 
physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the 
reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then 
occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and 
perceptions already produced by the external shock”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. § 1757, at 236. 
 49. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 41, at 432 (advocating adoption of a 
present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule); Edmund M. Morgan, Res 
Gestae, 12 WASH. L. REV. 91 (1937) (describing circumstances in which it is 
appropriate to recognize a present sense impression, despite an inclination against 
the exception). 
 50. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 329 (describing consideration of Rule 803(1) 
against a “backdrop . . . of massive judicial rejection of the present sense impression 
exception”). 
 51. Id. at 322–23. 
 52. Id. at 323. 
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the grain of the common law and included the present sense 
impression in the Federal Rules of Evidence.53  Although the 
exception proved controversial, it was ultimately retained by Congress 
and still enjoys its position as the first exception to the hearsay rule 
appearing in Federal Rule of Evidence 803.54 
C. E-hearsay:  The Era of Facebook, Twitter, and the Text 
Dramatic changes in available communication platforms as a result 
of the technological revolution promise to have significant impact on 
hearsay evidence.  Over the past decade, technology has developed 
methods of harnessing the power of the Internet in tiny hand-held 
devices capable of following users anywhere and everywhere.55  As 
technology has advanced, private enterprise has been prolific in the 
creation of new platforms for communicating via the Internet.  
Computer and smartphone users are now able to engage in an 
infinite array of electronic activities—such as e-mailing, texting, 
tweeting, posting status updates, playing games, locating businesses 
or friends, or diagnosing illness—from anywhere in the world.56  
Importantly, such technology has allowed users to remain constantly 
connected to a network of designated friends and followers through 
sites such as Facebook and Twitter.57 
 A social media community has arisen as a result of these new 
platforms.  This community has developed a culture of 
communication that is marked by a pervasive connection to one’s 
network of on-line friends and the constant posting of updates, 
observations and activities.  Participation in this online community is 
not limited to college students and teenagers.  News outlets, 
politicians, businesses, government entities, celebrities, and people of 
                                                 
 53. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note. 
 54. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 329 (noting opposition by the American 
Bar Association and the Association of Trial Lawyers of America to the initial 
inclusion of the present sense impression in the Rules). 
 55. See Jenna Wortham, New Apps Connect to Friends Nearby, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 
2012, at B1 (describing the near ubiquity of smartphones and the ease with which 
users can correspond with friends given the meteoric rise of social networking via 
mobile “apps”). 
 56. See, e.g., Apps that Let You Share Cars, Photos and Money, NPR (June 20, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/06/20/137058934/apps-that-let-you-share-cars-photos-
and-money (describing how “[s]martphone apps let us play games, count calories, 
find cheap gas—just about anything developers can dream up”); Anushay Hossain, 
Downloading Empowerment:  Application Gives Citizens Control Over Crime, FORBES (Feb. 2, 
2012, 12:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/worldviews/2012/02/01/ 
downloading-empowerment-application-gives-citizens-control-over-crime. 
 57. Twitter, Inc., 151 F.T.C. 162 (March 2, 2011) (consent order); Key Facts, 
FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last 
visited June 9, 2012). 
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all ages are now plugged into the Facebook and Twitter communities 
as a matter of course.58 
The possibilities for the creation and preservation of e-hearsay 
through these social media sites and other wireless capabilities are 
obvious.  Indeed, Professor Bellin has aptly noted that “Twitter could 
be the brainchild of mischievous evidence scholars.”59  One can 
readily appreciate how tweets, texts, videos, and status updates may 
contain hearsay statements describing events declarants are 
experiencing as they type. Indeed, the on-line community that has 
grown up around sites like Facebook and Twitter encourages and 
feeds the practice of posting constant electronic assertions regarding 
the daily activities and observations of users.  Professor Bellin has 
expressed concern that this plethora of information will flood into 
the trial process through the present sense impression exception, 
threatening its integrity with unreliable and self-serving statements 
designed to entertain, spin, and socialize rather than to report 
accurately.60  As a result, he claims that there is an urgent need to 
amend the requirements of the present sense impression under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) to prevent such wholesale admission 
of “tweets” and “status updates” and “texts” into American trials.61  
He recommends the addition of a “percipient witness” requirement 
to Rule 803(1) to foreclose the admissibility of uncorroborated e-
hearsay.62  Under this proposal, present sense impression evidence 
could only be introduced at trial through a witness with personal 
knowledge of the event or condition described by the hearsay 
statement.63 
Although wholesale admission of such social media e-hearsay into 
the trial process would raise significant reliability concerns, the risk 
that courts will permit such indiscriminate use of tweets and texts 
under existing requirements of the present sense impression 
exception appears minimal.  Because Twitter encourages users to 
answer the question “what’s happening?,” it is undoubtedly tailor-
made to elicit e-hearsay containing the subject matter covered by the 
present sense impression.  The subject matter requirement for the 
admissibility of present sense impressions represents only one 
                                                 
 58. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 336 n.16 (discussing a tweet by a celebrity claiming 
to have raced with Justin Bieber shortly before Bieber collided with another vehicle); 
Barack Obama, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/BarackObama. 
 59. Bellin, supra note 6, at 334. 
 60. See generally Bellin, supra note 6. 
 61. Id. at 366. 
 62. Id. at 370. 
 63. Id. 
RICHTER.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 8/27/2012  12:18 PM 
1670 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1657 
requirement for admission, however.  Trial judges must also ascertain 
that the event or condition described by the statement occurred or 
existed, that the declarant had personal knowledge of that event or 
condition, and that the declarant made the assertion while perceiving 
the event or condition or immediately thereafter.64  These 
requirements will serve as important checks on the wholesale 
admission of ubiquitous tweets, texts, and status updates. 
D. The Present Sense Impression:  Crossing the E-hearsay Frontier 
1. Human ingenuity and evolving methods of communication 
There are many reasons to expect that trial and appellate courts 
will police e-hearsay effectively under existing requirements of the 
present sense impression.  Most importantly, although social media 
and other e-hearsay may employ cutting-edge vernacular and 
originate from new locations, it remains human communication.  
Where the only change  involves norms of communication 
methodology, existing hearsay rules are sufficient to regulate this 
form of human expression with all of its  nuances and peculiarities.  
Trial judges have ample experience in adapting the requirements of 
the present sense impression exception, as well as other hearsay 
exceptions, to all forms of human communication.65  This experience 
will allow courts to respond appropriately to the latest modification in 
the format of human communication—social media and other e-
hearsay.  Indeed, throughout the history of the hearsay doctrine, 
technology has constantly pushed human communication into new 
formats, requiring consideration by the courts.   
Although communication norms at the time of Thayer’s 
scholarship may have contemplated oral communication of a present 
sense impression to a percipient witness in the usual case, methods of 
human communication are inherently variable and defy precise 
prediction regardless of the era.  Common methods of 
communication at the time of Thayer’s work also raised the 
possibility of present sense impressions without a percipient 
corroborating witness.  In the famous case of Regina v. Bedingfield,66 
which spurred Thayer’s three-part essay on res gestae, Mrs. Rudd 
allegedly alighted from her bedroom with her throat cut and 
exclaimed:  “Oh, aunt, see what Bedingfield has done to me.”67  
                                                 
 64. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 65. See infra notes 105–09 (discussing application of hearsay doctrine to various 
forms of human communication prior to the Internet). 
 66. 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 341 (Crown Ct. 1879). 
 67. Orenstein, supra note 16, at 116. 
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Bedingfield was found in the bedroom with a shallow cut in his throat 
from which he recovered.68  Although Bedingfield was quickly tried 
and hanged for Mrs. Rudd’s murder, scholars decried the trial court’s 
rejection of Mrs. Rudd’s statement, noting the closeness in time 
between the event and the speech, the startling nature of the attack, 
the independent evidence suggesting that the event occurred, and 
Mrs. Rudd’s personal knowledge of what had transpired in her 
room.69  In this context, the victim’s statement appears to meet the 
timing requirement of the present sense impression.70  Because of the 
slight lapse in time permitted by the rule, as recognized by Thayer, 
the hearsay exception is capable of allowing a present sense 
impression made to a testifying witness who was not a witness to the 
underlying events at issue.71  Even before advances in communication 
technology, therefore, an oral present sense impression without a 
percipient witness was not impossible or even unlikely.72 
Furthermore, written communication was obviously common at the 
time of Thayer’s work.  The availability of written documentation 
creates another potential method for remote communication of 
present sense impressions.  A nineteenth century businessman could 
easily have taken contemporaneous notes of a closed-door meeting 
and handed them to his assistant outside the door at the conclusion 
of the meeting.  While the assistant could authenticate the notes and 
provide proof of the meeting, the timing of the notes, and the 
author’s personal knowledge of the event, the assistant, who did not 
attend the meeting, would not constitute a percipient witness capable 
of corroborating events at the meeting.73  Even in Thayer’s era, 
therefore, one could not universally assume an oral present sense 
impression to another percipient witness. 
Of course, technology has fundamentally altered the methods and 
speed of human communication.  This communication revolution 
                                                 
 68. Bedingfield, 14 Cox Crim. Cas. at 342. 
 69. Orenstein, supra note 16, at 117 (noting the firestorm of criticism generated 
by the trial court’s decision to exclude the alleged statement).   
 70. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 71. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note (observing that a “slight 
lapse” between perception and speech is allowable). 
 72. Oral present sense impressions to a close witness who lacks personal 
knowledge of underlying events continue to appear even under modern 
communication norms.  See United States v. Danford, 435 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 
2005) (affirming use of present sense impression exception to allow immediate oral 
explanation of conversation to fellow store employee too far away to overhear 
conversation for herself). 
 73. See United States v. Santos, 65 F. Supp. 2d 802, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (allowing 
admission of handwritten notes of conversation as present sense impression); United 
States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 97–98 (D. Mass. 1997) (allowing contemporaneous 
handwritten meeting notes into evidence through present sense impression). 
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did not begin with Internet or wireless connectivity, however.  
Remote communication technology started more slowly:  “[r]apid 
signaling at a distance began with hand signs, smoke signals, flags, 
drumbeats, hornblowing, flashing mirrors and lanterns, cannon 
shots, beacons, carrier pigeons, and signaling positions (semaphores) 
of various kinds.”74  Samuel F. Morse developed the idea of using 
short and long impulses corresponding to letters of the alphabet and 
patented his system in 1837.75  With the arrival of the telegraph, it 
became possible for one person to communicate remotely with 
another about ongoing events as a routine matter.76  Indeed, the 
telegraph was frequently used, much as social media is today, to make 
others far away aware of local events or conditions.77  The telegraph’s 
resemblance to the modern use of abbreviated text messages sent 
from remote locations is powerful, thus illustrating that existing 
hearsay doctrine was designed to handle the fundamental and 
longstanding reality of remote human communication.  
Further, Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone in 1876, 
and long-distance service between New York and Chicago opened in 
1892.78  With the advent of this technology, human communication 
was forever transformed, allowing instantaneous transmission of 
human assertions to remote locations.  Akin to current social media 
and other Internet capabilities, the telephone became widely 
available and utilized routinely by people around the world.79  
Importantly, although the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
clearly relied upon the research of Thayer and Morgan in 
recognizing the present sense impression, they were drafting in the 
early 1970s—a full century after development of telephone 
technology.80  At this time in our technological evolution, telephones 
were a common part of daily existence, thus expanding the potential 
contexts in which a present sense impression could be made beyond 
                                                 
 74. George Gerbner, Communications, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 423, 425 
(Int’l ed. 1979). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. (noting that telegraphy, “introduced in 1844, was a vital step on the 
road to instantaneous, worldwide communication”). 
 77. See SAMUEL F. B. MORSE, EXAMINATION OF THE TELEGRAPHIC APPARATUS AND THE 
PROCESSES IN TELEGRAPHY 16 (1869) (describing the telegraph as a means of 
communicating from a distance and distinguishing it from other forms of 
communication that existed at the time). 
 78. Gerbner, supra note 74. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note (demonstrating the 
influence past scholarship had on adopting the exception); see also Morgan, supra 
note 49, at 91 (promoting the addition of a present sense impression exception); 
Thayer, supra note 30, at 71 (introducing the argument for the present sense 
exception). 
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the face-to-face oral assertion to a percipient witness.  Surely, the 
drafters of original Rule 803(1) were aware of and contemplated this 
not-esoteric probability.81  Nonetheless, the drafters of the original 
Federal Rules of Evidence did not limit the admission of present 
sense impressions to those related by other percipient witnesses.82  
Because remote human communication that characterizes social 
media e-hearsay was prevalent when the present sense impression 
exception was originally recognized in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
the proliferation of social media e-hearsay does not raise a new and 
different set of hearsay concerns necessitating a new and different 
type of regulation. 
Finally, courts have successfully applied existing hearsay doctrine to 
e-mail communications for many years.83  The ability to make 
instantaneous electronic assertions to remote witnesses about events 
those witnesses cannot perceive or corroborate is nothing new.  The 
social media and text message revolution is simply an extension of 
the e-mail capabilities routinely available since the early 1990s.  With 
a hand-held device, one can, in essence, keep a computer in a pocket 
to send an e-mail or text from anywhere.  With Facebook and Twitter, 
one can broadcast an assertion to a wider audience more readily.  
Still, the fact remains that these are simply human assertions made to 
others at remote locations.  To be sure, Twitter’s question “what’s 
happening?” and Facebook’s encouragement of the “status update” 
may be spurring the creation of more potential present sense 
impressions.  Still, those tweets and updates remain human 
communication to a remote audience that courts and lawyers have 
handled under existing rules for over 20 years.84  Although the latest 
                                                 
 81. Indeed, even pre-Rules cases used a common law precursor to the present 
sense impression exception to allow hearsay statements describing remote telephone 
conversations.  See Nuttall v. Reading Co., 235 F.2d 546, 551–52 (3d Cir. 1956) 
(allowing wife to testify to deceased husband’s hearsay statements describing 
telephone call with his employer immediately after call ended). 
 82. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (requiring only that the statement describing an 
event be made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it). 
 83. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 554 (D. Md. 2007) (“[E]-
mail evidence often figures prominently in cases where state of mind, motive, and 
intent must be proved.  Indeed, it is not unusual to see a case consisting almost 
entirely of e-mail evidence.”); United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 99 (D. Mass. 
1997) (evaluating and allowing e-mail message as a present sense impression). 
 84. Indeed, courts have rejected the notion that new and improved evidentiary 
rules are necessary to deal with electronic communication: 
[E]ssentially, appellant would have us create a whole new body of law just to 
deal with e-mails or instant messages.  The argument is that e-mails or text 
messages are inherently unreliable because of their relative anonymity and 
the fact that [they] . . . can rarely be connected to a specific author with any 
certainty . . . .  However, the same uncertainties exist with traditional written 
documents.  A signature can be forged; a letter can by typed on another’s 
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technological innovations may provide a convenient platform for re-
arguing the merits of the present sense impression, the recent 
change in the quantity and format of human communications leaves 
the fundamental substantive issues raised by the exception 
unaltered.85  So long as e-hearsay remains human communication, 
trial and appellate courts are well-equipped to deal with the hearsay 
challenges it brings using existing doctrine. 
2. Limits on the e-present sense impression 
Despite the novel format of e-hearsay assertions, the existing 
requirements of the present sense impression exception remain more 
than adequate to deal with the reliability concerns they present.  Trial 
courts evaluating e-hearsay in the form of texts, tweets, or status 
updates under the current present sense impression exception must 
determine that the statements were made contemporaneously with 
the declarant’s personal observation of the underlying events or 
conditions.86  Because Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) authorizes the 
trial judge to assess the preliminary requirements of hearsay 
exceptions unrestrained by the rules of evidence, a trial judge may 
use the purported e-present sense impression evidence itself to 
demonstrate the occurrence of the event, declarant’s personal 
knowledge of it, and the timing of the statement.87 
In theory, therefore, an e-hearsay statement could appear to satisfy 
the requirements for its own admission under Rule 803(1) on its face.  
To illustrate this concern about e-hearsay and the present sense 
impression, Professor Bellin creates a fun and fictional tweet: 
[@]Lord Cobham 5 minutes ago 
Talking treason over beers with @SirWalter, don’t tell the King! 
☺88 
He asks “what proof is this? Indeed.”89  This clever hypothetical 
suggests that this tweet alone could satisfy the requirements of Rule 
803(1) because it purports to relate an ongoing event personally 
                                                 
typewriter; distinct letterhead stationary [sic] can be copied or stolen. 
Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 543. 
 85. See id. at 538 n.5 (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 102 “contemplates 
that the rules of evidence are flexible enough to accommodate future ‘growth and 
development’ to address technical changes not in existence as of the codification of 
the rules themselves”). 
 86. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 87. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (providing that a trial judge is “not bound by 
evidence rules, except those on privilege” in deciding preliminary questions of 
admissibility); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178 (1987). 
 88. Bellin, supra note 6, at 336. 
 89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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observed by Lord Cobham and that Sir Walter Raleigh could be 
convicted in the American trial system on the basis of such 
questionable e-hearsay.90  Putting aside for a moment whether the 
tweet could satisfy the requirements of the present sense impression 
exception by itself, it is important to keep in mind that this tweet, 
even if it were admissible, would be inadequate to support an 
indictment for treason, let alone a conviction.91  Rule 803(1) governs 
the admissibility and not the sufficiency of trial evidence.92  Without 
additional evidence, such as damning texts and tweets from Sir 
Walter Raleigh’s own accounts and observations of Sir Walter with 
known enemies of the State engaged in malfeasance, a treason 
conviction is nothing more than whimsical fiction.93  Side-by-side with 
other damning bits of evidence, however, Lord Cobham’s tweet could 
potentially be admitted to assist the jury in resolving the disputed 
question of Sir Walter Raleigh’s loyalty.  This important reality 
eliminates any genuine danger of criminal convictions premised 
solely on uncorroborated Twitter present sense impressions. 
Exploring whether e-hearsay will support its own admissibility as a 
present sense impression, imagine the following more commonplace 
tweet: 
@Passenger 2 minutes ago 
Drinking beers with Driver in his ride on the way home-cheers!94 
This tweet suggests an event:  That Driver and Passenger are in a 
vehicle heading home.  It also indicates that Passenger is in the car 
with Driver and has personal knowledge of Driver’s conduct in the 
car.  It then describes Driver’s drinking conduct in a manner that 
suggests that the tweet and Passenger’s perception of Driver are 
occurring simultaneously.  Therefore, the tweet itself may purport to 
satisfy all the requisites for admission of a present sense impression.  
                                                 
 90. Id. at 335. 
 91. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006) (“Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, 
levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort 
within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason . . . .”). 
 92. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175 (“The [Rule 104(a)] inquiry . . . is not whether 
the proponent of the evidence wins or loses his case on the merits, but whether the 
evidentiary rules have been satisfied.”); People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 911 
(Mich. 1998) (Boyle, J., concurring) (“The role of the Rule 104(a) determination is 
not to determine the defendant’s guilt; rather, the purpose is merely to determine 
whether the preliminary fact has been established by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”). 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006). 
 94. Tweets describing such driving conduct appear commonplace in the world of 
social media.  See Bellin, supra note 6, at 336 n.16 (describing the tweet of a celebrity 
describing an automobile collision involving Justin Bieber). 
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If this hypothetical tweet can satisfy the requirements for its own 
admission, Driver might legitimately complain about the reliability of 
the information used to implicate him. 
As noted by the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 803, this 
concern is largely academic.95  Rarely will a proponent of a present 
sense impression need to rely exclusively on the hearsay statement 
itself to prove the threshold requirements for its admissibility.96  In 
the typical case in which subsequent events have transformed a 
mundane present sense impression into important evidence, there 
will almost always be ample information available to evaluate the 
threshold requirements of the exception, apart from the statement 
itself.97  For example, in a wrongful death case arising out of Driver’s 
collision with another vehicle, the plaintiff would undoubtedly wish 
to admit Passenger’s tweet to prove Driver’s intoxication at the time 
of the accident.  Where plaintiff can identify Passenger as a person 
riding in Driver’s car at the time of the collision, plaintiff can 
demonstrate Passenger’s ability to perceive Driver’s conduct.  Even 
evidence that Driver and Passenger were seen together at some point 
close to the time of the collision would tend to support Passenger’s 
personal observation of Driver’s conduct.  Geolocation features on 
Twitter and Facebook could potentially even assist in placing 
Passenger in the vicinity of the collision at the time of the tweet.98  In 
addition, a comparison between the time of the tweet and the time of 
the collision could demonstrate that the tweet was posted while 
Driver was on his way home, thus suggesting contemporaneous 
speech and observation.  Finally, evidence that Passenger used the 
Twitter handle @Passenger and that he had a wireless device capable 
of tweeting in the car or that he commonly carried one, could serve 
to authenticate the tweet as Passenger’s.99  Thus, there is likely to be 
some circumstantial evidence, apart from the present sense 
impression itself, suggesting the threshold requirements of 
contemporaneous personal observation by the declarant once 
                                                 
 95. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note. 
 96.  See id. (providing that in most cases there is at least some circumstantial 
evidence). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See David Ionescu, Facebook, Twitter Ready Location-Based Features, PCWORLD 
(Mar. 10, 2010, 5:10 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/191151/ 
facebook_twitter_ready_locationbased-features.html (noting how Facebook and 
Twitter are among the increasing number of social networks integrating geolocation 
capabilities). 
 99. FED. R. EVID. 901 (delineating the requirement for authentication of evidence 
that “the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
item is what the proponent claims it is”). 
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litigation arises. 
Although Rule 803(1) does not demand it, there often will be some 
extrinsic evidence that actually corroborates the content of 
declarant’s present sense impression as well.  In the wrongful death 
case, the subsequent collision, of course, provides some independent 
corroboration that something was amiss with one of the drivers 
involved.  Further, there may even be additional evidence to 
corroborate Passenger’s Twitter present-sense impression, such as 
beers found at the scene, Driver’s inebriated demeanor, or Driver’s 
blood alcohol level after the collision.  Therefore, when a lawsuit has 
arisen out of events related to a present sense impression and that 
lawsuit is sufficiently meritorious to reach the trial stage, the absence 
of any independent evidence supporting the requirements for 
admission of a relevant present sense impression is highly unlikely.   
This reality notwithstanding, the theoretical possibility of admitting 
tweets like Passenger’s, that are wholly uncorroborated, remains if 
one looks solely to Rule 803(1) because the Rule does not demand 
independent evidence to satisfy its threshold requirements.100  It is 
this theoretical possibility that gives critics of the present sense 
impression exception pause.101  This concern, however, is merely old 
wine poured into the contemporary carafe of e-hearsay.  Allowing 
hearsay statements to lift themselves by their own “bootstraps” to 
satisfy the requirements of a hearsay exception was long prohibited 
under the common law of evidence as it existed before the Federal 
Rules.102  In United States v. Bourjaily, a case involving the 
coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the Supreme Court 
found that the Federal Rules of Evidence reversed the common law 
prohibition on “bootstrapping” through Rule 104(a), which 
authorizes a trial judge to decide preliminary questions of 
admissibility unrestrained by evidentiary rules.103  Where a proffered 
hearsay statement itself is merely one item of information available 
for the trial judge to consider in evaluating the admissibility of 
hearsay, the Supreme Court held that Rule 104(a) expressly 
authorizes its use.104  The Court declined to decide whether a trial 
court must also find independent evidence apart from the hearsay 
                                                 
 100. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 101. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 335 (describing the potential for abuse of the 
present sense impression exception). 
 102. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S 171, 177 (1987) (noting that the Courts of 
Appeal had widely held that “in determining the preliminary facts relevant to co-
conspirators’ out-of-court statements, a court may not look at the hearsay statements 
themselves for their evidentiary value”). 
 103. Id. at 177–78. 
 104. Id. at 178–79. 
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statement to support its admissibility because ample independent 
evidence existed on the facts of Bourjaily.105  Therefore, consistent 
with Bourjaily and Rule 104(a), trial judges may undoubtedly utilize a 
proffered text or tweet itself to satisfy the requirements of the present 
sense impression exception.106 
Merely considering the content of the e-hearsay itself is not 
problematic from a reliability standpoint.  Rather, it is the use of the 
proffered e-present sense impression evidence alone to prove its own 
admissibility that raises reliability concerns.  While there is nothing 
within the text of Rule 803(1) that prohibits a trial judge from 
utilizing the present sense impression alone to satisfy its 
requirements, a more holistic evaluation of the Federal Rules 
framework suggests that trial judges will look for some independent 
evidence to satisfy the requirements of the present sense impression 
before admitting e-hearsay into evidence.  Thus, even under the 
current requirements of Rule 803(1), trial judges do not admit 
present sense impressions like Passenger’s tweet without some 
independent evidence suggesting Passenger’s personal knowledge of 
underlying events and the timing of his tweet.   
First, the burden of proof applicable to a trial judge’s preliminary 
findings counsels against use of a proffered hearsay statement alone 
to establish the requirements for its own admissibility.107  The 
Supreme Court has held that a trial judge must make Rule 104(a) 
preliminary findings by a preponderance of the evidence.108  If a 
tweet like Passenger’s were the only evidence available to suggest that 
Passenger had personal knowledge of Driver’s conduct and was 
tweeting as he observed it, the tweet alone would appear to be 
inadequate to fulfill even a preponderance standard.  Without 
witnesses or other information suggesting the occurrence of the 
described event, declarant’s personal knowledge of it, and the timing 
of the statement, a trial judge would be unable to find it “more likely 
than not” that declarant described the event while perceiving it.  
Therefore, the standard of proof applicable to preliminary findings 
should prevent pure “bootstrapping” in the e-present sense 
impression context. 
Second, the co-conspirator exception in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence was amended following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                 
 105. Id. at 181. 
 106. Id. at 178. 
 107. Id. at 177. 
 108. Id. at 175–76. 
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Bourjaily.109  This amendment requires at least some independent 
evidence apart from the proffered hearsay statement itself to satisfy 
the standards for admitting a co-conspirator hearsay statement.110  It 
provides that a trial court “must” consider the hearsay statement, but 
cautions that the proffered hearsay statement “does not by itself 
establish” the requirements for admissibility.111  Thus, this provision 
of the Rules rejects pure “bootstrapping” in the context of the co-
conspirator exception. 
This concern over “bootstrapping” is not unique to the co-
conspirator exception and indeed arises whenever a hearsay 
exception requires the existence of a certain relationship, type of 
event, or other factual condition precedent to admissibility.112  The 
present sense impression, with its timing and personal knowledge 
requirements, presents similar concerns over “bootstrapping” and 
independent evidence.113  Allowing Passenger’s tweet alone to satisfy 
the requirements for its own admissibility as a present sense 
impression is simply an example of pure “bootstrapping” in the Rule 
803 context.114  By amending the co-conspirator exception in 1997, 
the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence clearly signaled that trial 
judges must look for some independent evidence to support the 
existence of a conspiracy between a declarant and a party before 
admitting that declarant’s hearsay statement against the party.115 
This independent evidence requirement should apply equally to 
present sense impressions in light of the similar purpose served by 
threshold requirements enumerated under the co-conspirator 
exception and Rule 803.116  Within the context of the co-conspirator 
                                                 
 109. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note. 
 110. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
 111. Id. (extending the independent evidence requirement to declarant’s 
speaking authority or the declarant’s employment relationship for purposes of 
admissions by speaking agents and other employees as well). 
 112. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 844 (4th ed. 
2009) (noting similar issues in context of excited utterance exception). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (“[O]n occasion the 
only evidence may be the content of the statement itself . . . .”). 
 115. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note (noting that “the contents 
of the declarant’s statement do not alone suffice to establish a conspiracy in which 
the declarant and the defendant participated”). 
 116. From the standpoint of statutory construction, one could argue that the 
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence intended no independent evidence 
requirement for exceptions like the present sense impression and the excited 
utterance where the Rules fail to include any such express requirement.  See People v. 
Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 911 (Mich. 1998) (Boyle, J., concurring) (“[I]n stark 
contrast to the explicit language contained in [Rule] 801(d)(2)(E) and 804(b)(3), 
the requirement of extrinsic corroboration is clearly and conspicuously absent from 
the language of the rule [803] itself or the requisite elements.”). 
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exception, it is deemed unfair to introduce the hearsay statements of 
a declarant against a party absent some independent proof of the 
requisite co-conspirator relationship between them.117  Hence, 
independent evidence of the co-conspirator relationship is needed to 
trigger the justification for admitting the hearsay.  In the context of 
the present sense impression, the hearsay statement is not deemed 
sufficiently reliable absent a showing that the declarant had personal 
knowledge of an event and spoke as she observed it.118 Hence, like 
the co-conspirator relationship requirement within the co-
conspirator exception, these threshold factual findings are also 
necessary to trigger the justification for admitting these hearsay 
statements.  Where the purpose of the preliminary requirements is 
the same, both should require the same method of proof with some 
information independent of the hearsay statement.119  Indeed, there 
appears to be no logical counterargument in favor of pure 
“bootstrapping.”120  Therefore, a rational examination of the 
requirements for admitting hearsay evidence counsels against the 
admission of tweets like Passenger’s, without independent 
information supporting the threshold requirements for its 
admissibility.121 
                                                 
 117. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note (“Admissions by a party 
opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their 
admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction 
of the conditions of the hearsay rule.”). 
 118. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (“The present rule proceeds 
upon the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may 
possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify 
nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial even though he may be 
available.”). 
 119. See United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 207 (6th Cir. 2007) (Moore, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “first principles demand that the excited utterance itself 
cannot constitute the only evidence of a startling event”). 
 120. See id. at 209 (“Although some of these authorities claim that admitting such 
statements is the ‘generally prevailing rule,’ they neither cite recent authority nor 
provide explanations of why such circular reasoning is permissible.” (citation 
omitted)); State v. Post, 901 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that none 
of the commentators, suggesting that a hearsay statement alone can prove its 
admissibility, “explain with any detail the reasoning for their position”). 
 121. The principal support for “bootstrapping” in the Rule 803 context appears 
to come from the original Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 803.  See FED R. EVID. 
803 advisory committee’s note (explaining that a declarant’s personal knowledge 
“may appear from his statement or be inferable from the circumstances” and that 
cases allowing use of a hearsay statement alone to prove the startling event for 
purposes of the excited utterance exception are “increasing”).  Many treatises parrot 
the Advisory Committee statement that bootstrapping is the prevailing view.  
Contemporary cases and treatises suggest a more thoughtful approach following 
Bourjaily.  See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 272, at 257 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 
2006) (“The issue [of whether a hearsay statement alone can prove a startling event] 
has not yet been resolved under the Federal Rules.”).  Even the original Advisory 
Committee notes recognized judicial reluctance to allow the hearsay statement of an 
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Furthermore, the trial courts policing the application of the 
present sense impression in the era of e-hearsay are likely to follow 
this approach.  Given the common law rejection of any use of a 
hearsay statement in deciding its own admissibility, trial judges are 
unlikely to adopt the opposite approach and routinely allow hearsay 
statements alone to prove the requirements for their own 
admissibility.122  If anything, courts are likely to retain some of their 
pre-Bourjaily aversion to utilizing the hearsay statement at all.123  
Indeed, after the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide 
whether trial courts must find independent evidence in Bourjaily, 
every federal court of appeals confronting the issue required “some 
evidence in addition to the contents of the statement.”124 
Cases reviewing admissibility of hearsay through the Rule 803 
exceptions illustrate this insistence upon independent evidence.  
First, the vast majority of cases examining the present sense 
impression and excited utterance exceptions, where the concern over 
independent evidence is especially salient, do not consider the 
question of “bootstrapping” and the need for independent evidence 
at all.  The reason for this, as discussed above in connection with 
Passenger’s hypothetical tweet, is that there is typically ample 
independent information to support the threshold requirements of 
these hearsay exceptions and courts need not expressly consider 
whether information independent of the hearsay statement is 
required to support its admissibility.  Where independent evidence is 
available, the question of “bootstrapping” is moot because the 
hearsay exception is satisfied regardless of the approach adopted.  
Thus, the issue of bootstrapping remains “largely academic” in the 
vast majority of cases.125 
                                                 
“unidentified bystander” alone to prove declarant’s perception of underlying events 
for purposes of the present sense impression.  FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s 
note. 
 122. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 177 (1987) (noting the common 
law rejection of “bootstrapping” approach to the admission of hearsay). 
 123. See People v. Barrett, 747 N.W.2d 797, 803–04 (Mich. 2008) (adopting 
Bourjaily, over twenty years after the decision was rendered, and permitting use of the 
hearsay statement in evaluating its admissibility for the first time). 
 124. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note. 
 125. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) and (2) advisory committee’s note (“Whether proof of the 
startling event may be made by the statement itself is largely an academic question, 
since in most cases, there is present at least circumstantial evidence that something 
of a startling nature must have occurred.”); see also United States v. Woodfolk, 656 
A.2d 1145, 1150 (D.C. 1995) (“[O]nly in the unusual case will there be a complete 
lack of evidence, direct or circumstantial, to indicate whether an event has occurred 
that could account for the excitedness of the utterance.”); 2 MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE, supra note 121, § 272, at 217–18 (“Fortunately, only a very few cases need 
actually confront this knotty theoretical problem if the courts view the independent 
evidence concept broadly, as they should where the circumstances and content of 
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Moreover, the federal and state decisions that have specifically 
addressed the issue of “bootstrapping” confirm judicial insistence on 
some independent evidence in the context of Rule 803 exceptions.  
While most of the decisions squarely addressing this issue involve the 
excited utterance exception and the need for independent 
information to prove a “startling event,” the underlying analysis 
remains pertinent for the present sense impression.126  The vast 
majority of courts require at least some evidence independent of the 
hearsay statement under consideration itself, to support a finding of 
admissibility under the Rule 803 exceptions and their state 
counterparts.127  While the decisions vary with respect to the amount 
of independent evidence required, they agree that a Rule 803 hearsay 
statement alone should not establish its own admissibility.128  
                                                 
the statement indicate trustworthiness.”). 
 126. See People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 909 (Mich. 1998) (“Given the 
analytical similarity between the present sense impression and excited utterance 
exceptions, we conclude that their independent evidence requirements are similarly 
analogous.”). 
 127. See United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 209 (6th Cir. 2007) (Moore, J., 
dissenting) (“Reaching the same conclusion that I have, various courts have held 
that a hearsay statement itself cannot serve as the sole evidence of the alleged 
startling event that spurred the statement.”); United States v. McCullough, 150 F. 
App’x 507, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that “an excited utterance can not 
establish its own underlying event”); United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 577 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (deciding that an anonymous note failed to satisfy personal knowledge 
requirement for admission as a present sense impression or excited utterance “given 
the total lack of information regarding the circumstances of the note’s creation”); 
Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 511–12 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding the record “empty” 
of any circumstances from which the trial court could have inferred by a 
preponderance that the declarant saw the defendant cut in); Woodfolk, 656 A.2d at 
1150 (“We may assume . . . that the mere making of the statement itself cannot alone 
serve as sufficient evidence of the occurrence of a startling event.”); People v. 
Leonard, 400 N.E.2d 568, 572–73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (finding a hearsay statement 
was erroneously admitted as excited utterance without any independent evidence 
besides statement itself to establish startling event); Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d at 910 
(requiring extrinsic corroboration of the present sense impression); State v. Kemp, 
919 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that there must be at least some 
evidence of the basic event, independent of the declaration that accompanies it, in 
order for hearsay to be admitted as an excited utterance);  State v. Post, 901 S.W.2d 
231, 234–35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that when determining whether to admit 
hearsay statement under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, the 
sound approach is to require some independent proof that the event giving rise to 
the utterance could have occurred); People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 374 (N.Y. 
1993) (“[B]efore present sense impression testimony is received there must be some 
evidence in addition to the statements themselves to assure the court that the 
statements . . . were made spontaneously and contemporaneously with the events 
described.”); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 456 A.2d 1037, 1040 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) 
(noting that an excited utterance cannot be admitted where there is no independent 
evidence that a startling event has occurred); State v. Young, 161 P.3d 967, 973–74 
(Wash. 2007) (en banc) (finding that declarant’s statement alone is insufficient to 
corroborate the occurrence of the startling event, but that circumstantial evidence, 
independent of the bare words can corroborate that a startling event occurred). 
 128. See McCullough, 150 F. App’x. at 509–10 (noting that “an excited utterance 
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Therefore, the courts specifically examining this issue reject pure 
“bootstrapping” under Rule 803.129  Consistent with this judicial 
trend, courts can be expected to seek some independent evidence 
beyond a proffered text or tweet to establish declarant’s personal 
observation of the events described and his contemporaneous 
assertion in applying the present sense impression to e-hearsay.130   
Therefore, although reference to the language of Rule 803(1) 
alone might suggest that a tweet could prove its own admissibility 
through the present sense impression exception, a more holistic view 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence framework, applying contemporary 
precedent and evidentiary policies, reveals the need for some 
information apart from the e-hearsay itself to support admissibility.  
That said, the rules do not demand a specific form or type of 
information to fulfill this role.  Purely circumstantial evidence 
suggesting declarant’s perception and the timing of the hearsay may 
serve this purpose.  Nor do the rules require extrinsic evidence 
corroborating the content of the hearsay statement.131  So long as 
there is sufficient information supporting declarant’s ability to 
perceive and his contemporaneous speech, independent verification 
                                                 
cannot establish its own underlying event”).  Compare Young, 161 P.3d at 973–74 
(allowing circumstantial evidence to suggest “startling event” for purposes of excited 
utterance exception), with Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d at 910 (requiring proof 
completely independent of present sense impression to prove observed event). 
 129. Some courts that recognize the “bootstrapping” concerns inherent in the 
application of Rule 803 exceptions sidestep a holding regarding an independent 
evidence requirement by finding ample independent evidence to satisfy Rule 
104(a)’s preponderance standard in the particular case.  See Arnold, 486 F.3d at 185 
(confronting the issue of whether the “uncorroborated content of an excited 
utterance should . . . be permitted by itself to establish the startling nature of the 
event” and finding that the issue “need not detain” it where “considerable non-
hearsay evidence corroborated the anxiety-inducing nature of this event”). 
 130. A few courts have purported to allow use of the hearsay statement alone to 
prove the requirements for Rule 803 exceptions.  United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 
454, 459 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that “the declaration itself may establish that a 
startling event occurred” (citing United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570–71 (7th 
Cir. 1986))).  Notably, Brown and Moore offer no rationale for allowing a hearsay 
statement alone to support its own admissibility.  Id.  Further, when these cases are 
examined closely, they reveal independent information beyond the hearsay 
statement itself to support the requirements for the applicable Rule 803 exception.  
See id. at 461 (addressing defendant’s argument that the government carried a 
“heavier burden” with respect to hearsay statements of anonymous bystanders and 
emphasizing the testimony of the arresting officer that he “almost immediately came 
upon Brown, who was visibly carrying a gun” and that he personally observed 
declarants “yelling,” “very excited,” “very nervous,” and “hopping around”); see also 
Arnold, 486 F.3d at 209 n.6 (Moore, J., dissenting) (noting that the cases cited in 
support of  “bootstrapping” often involve independent evidence). 
 131. See United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 646–47 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that 
the federal rule does not require corroboration); Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 
351–52 (opining that an independent corroboration requirement is “virtually 
impossible to rationalize as a matter of statutory construction” and that courts 
adding such a requirement are engaged in “unwarranted judicial legislation”). 
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of declarant’s version of events is unnecessary.132  The Rules certainly 
do not demand a percipient witness to corroborate the threshold 
event, declarant’s observation of it, and the substance of declarant’s 
hearsay statement.133 
The proliferation of e-hearsay does not justify abandoning this 
methodology for evaluating the admissibility of the present sense 
impression.  Indeed, it would be inconsistent with the clear policy 
underlying Rule 104(a) to add a rigid percipient witness 
requirement.134  The Federal Rules are designed to allow the trial 
judge flexibility and discretion in the type and quantum of 
information needed to satisfy preliminary admissibility requirements.  
Utilizing the existing standards within the Federal Rules of Evidence 
framework, trial judges will have ample ammunition to prevent 
questionable tweets, texts, and status updates from flowing freely into 
the trial process.  Tweets, like Passenger’s in the foregoing example, 
will not be admitted as proof of disputed issues like Driver’s 
consumption of alcohol on the road, absent at least some 
circumstantial evidence apart from the e-hearsay to suggest 
Passenger’s personal knowledge and contemporaneous tweeting. 
Finally, unlike oral present sense impressions repeated by live 
witnesses, e-hearsay will have to be authenticated pursuant to Article 
9 of the Federal Rules before being admitted into evidence.135  
Litigants will be required to offer sufficient “foundation from which 
the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is what the 
proponent says it is.”136  Before a text message, tweet, or status update 
may be admitted, therefore, courts will have to find sufficient 
evidence from which the jury can ascertain that the e-hearsay actually 
originated from the purported declarant.137  Indeed, “courts have 
                                                 
 132. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 351 (noting that “[t]he text of the rule does 
not even hint at a general requirement for corroboration”). 
 133. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 134. See People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 914 n.19 (Mich. 1998) (Boyle, J., 
concurring) (“The effort by my colleague to impose by judicial fiat an extrinsic 
evidence requirement on hearsay exceptions in direct contravention of the clear and 
unambiguous language of [Rule] 104(a) is based primarily on distrust of the fact-
finder and the trial court judge, rather than any deficit in the rule itself.”). 
 135. FED. R. EVID. 901; see also Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 541 
(D. Md. 2007) (“In order for [electronically stored information] to be admissible, it 
also must be shown to be authentic.”). 
 136. United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 137. See United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(analyzing admissibility of printouts of computerized records); United States v. 
Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2000) (authenticating e-mail with 
circumstantial evidence); United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630-31 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(analyzing admissibility of exhibits reflecting chat room conversations); United States 
v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 1998) (evaluating methods for 
authenticating a printout of a chat room discussion). 
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recognized that authentication of [electronically stored information 
(“ESI”)] may require greater scrutiny than that required for the 
authentication of ‘hard-copy’ documents.”138  Trial judges may 
require witnesses to establish the declarant’s past practices with 
respect to e-hearsay, the location of the equipment used to post or 
send the electronic message, the declarant’s access to the equipment 
at the relevant time, and the access of anyone else at the relevant 
time, among other factors.139  Unless a reasonable jury could 
determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the e-present 
sense impression came from the declarant, it will not be admitted.140  
Failure to produce witnesses or other information capable of 
adequately authenticating e-hearsay will also serve as an impediment 
to the free flow of e-present sense impressions into the trial process.141  
Therefore, existing evidentiary requirements applicable to the 
present sense impression can be expected to control the admission of 
unreliable e-hearsay. 
3. A cautious judicial approach to present sense impressions 
Not only are the existing requirements of the present sense 
impression exception adequate to exclude unreliable e-hearsay, trial 
and appellate judges can be expected to apply those requirements 
                                                 
 138. Lorraine, 241 F.3d at 542–43. 
 139. See, e.g., State v. Damper, 225 P.3d 1148, 1153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (noting 
that testimony of victim’s friend established that text message came from victim’s cell 
phone, that cell phone was found with body, that there was no evidence that anyone 
other than the victim had access to that phone at the relevant time according to 
defendant’s version of events); Dickens v. State, 927 A.2d 32, 37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2007) (stating that evidence showing that a text message was sent from a phone in 
defendant’s possession and contained facts known only by defendant served to 
authenticate text). 
 140. FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a 
fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does 
exist.”).  Authentication is an issue of conditional relevance to which 104(b) applies.  
The Supreme Court has held that a preponderance of the evidence standard applies 
to 104(b) findings.  Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988). 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(explaining how proponent failed to authenticate exhibits taken from an 
organization’s website); In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 444–47 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2005) (detailing the various criteria for properly authenticating exhibits of 
electronically stored business records and holding that the proponent failed to meet 
these requirements through either witness testimony or other corroborating 
evidence); St. Luke’s Cataract & Laser Inst., P.A. v. Sanderson, NO. 8:06-CV-223-T-
MSS, 2006 WL 1320242, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2006) (excluding exhibits showing 
content of web pages where affidavits used to authenticate exhibits were factually 
inaccurate and affiants lacked personal knowledge); Rambus v. Infineon Techs. AG, 
348 F. Supp. 2d 698, 707 (E.D. Va. 2004) (showing that proponent inadequately 
authenticated computerized business records);  Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 423–24, 
428 (Md. 2011) (holding state’s failure to properly authenticate pages allegedly 
printed from victim’s profile on a social media website was reversible error). 
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cautiously and narrowly to e-hearsay if history is any guide.  Despite 
gaining recognition in the Federal Rules, the present sense 
impression traditionally has encountered obstacles in the 
courtroom.142  Courts have applied the existing requirements of the 
exception sparingly and strictly, and many have resisted application 
of the present sense impression by erecting additional common law 
barriers to admission outside the rules framework.143  Indeed, 
commentators have noted that the present sense impression “has not 
proved useful as anticipated” due to judicial circumspection in its 
application.144  Where history suggests that trial and appellate courts 
already carefully scrutinize present sense impressions before allowing 
them into evidence, there appears to be no urgent need for revision 
of Rule 803(1). 
As any evidence student worth her salt will tell you, timing is the key 
to the present sense impression.145  Because concerns over declarant 
memory and deceit regarding an event are significantly minimized 
only when declarant speaks as she observes, courts have carefully 
policed the timing requirement of the exception.146  Consistent with 
the policy behind the exception, many courts require 
contemporaneous or nearly contemporaneous speech in order to 
admit hearsay through Rule 803(1).147  Even courts that allow a 
“slight lapse” of time between the event and the assertion have 
rejected statements made more than a few minutes afterward.148  
                                                 
 142. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 325 (describing “courts’ conservatism in 
applying the present sense impression exception”). 
 143. See id. at 333–42 (identifying six different “judicial gloss[es]” placed upon 
the present sense impression by courts). 
 144. 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8:67, at 561; see also Imwinkelried, 
supra, note 10, at 343 (noting that “[t]he courts have severely cramped Rule 803(1) 
by adding one restriction after another to the statute’s scope”). 
 145. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8:67, at 559 (“The idea of 
immediacy lies at the heart of the exception.”). 
 146. See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 587 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusing to admit 
evidence as a present sense impression in the absence of evidence showing that the 
declaration was made immediately after the event occurred). 
 147. See United States v. Davis, 577 F.3d 660, 668 (6th Cir. 2009) (admitting 911 
call made “within thirty seconds to a minute after seeing Defendant”); United States 
v. Shoup, 476 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) (admitting phone call made “only one or 
two minutes” after event); United States v. Danford, 435 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 
2005) (allowing statement made less than sixty seconds after witnessing event); 
United States v. Parker, 936 F.2d 950, 954 (7th Cir. 1991) (statements made after 
walking approximately “100 feet” qualified as present sense impressions); United 
States v. Santos, 65 F. Supp. 802, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (notes made within five to ten 
minutes of conversation qualified as present sense impression); see also DAVID F. 
BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 8.3, at 257 (4th ed. 2011) (noting Colorado and 
Kansas rules requiring precise contemporaneity for admission of present sense 
impressions). 
 148. See United States v. Green, 556 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting 
statement made by confidential informant more than fifty minutes after drug 
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Further, in cases where the timing between the observation and 
speech has been extremely close, many courts have rejected 
application of the present sense impression where there appeared to 
be adequate time for the declarant to deliberate and make a 
conscious statement rather than a purely reflexive statement 
describing the event.149 
Although e-present sense impressions reflect human 
communication in a modern format, we can expect trial and 
appellate courts to monitor their timing with the same care.  Courts 
are certain to reject any tweet, text, or status update ostensibly 
describing past events.150  Indeed, much of the information that is 
posted on a Facebook wall or included in a text message may relate to 
the declarant’s past activities, rather than current observations and 
activities.  These will clearly fail to survive judicial scrutiny of the all-
important timing requirement.  To the extent that e-hearsay 
statements, like tweets, do purport to describe ongoing events, courts 
can be expected to apply the same rigorous analysis that they have 
historically used in this context.  Indeed, the electronic format of 
these hearsay statements that records the time of their transmission 
may assist judicial analysis of timing.151  Once a trial judge finds 
information to locate the underlying event in time, the court will be 
able to measure the nexus between that event and the transmission of 
                                                 
transaction under present sense impression exception because “courts consistently 
require substantial contemporaneity”); United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 840 
(8th Cir. 2004) (finding that a statement made after “an intervening walk or drive” 
inadmissible); United States v. Cruz, 765 F.2d 1020, 1024 (11th Cir. 1985) (rejecting 
statements of undercover agent several days after the event took place as 
insufficiently contemporaneous); United States v. Hamilton, 948 F. Supp. 635, 639 
(W.D. Ky. 1996) (rejecting photographic identification hearsay that came 
immediately after observation because photographic identification involves more 
than a present sense); Warren v. State, 774 A.2d 246, 253 (Del. 2001) (per curiam) 
(finding that statements made in 911 call about confrontation one hour earlier were 
too far removed from event to qualify as present sense impressions); State v. Moore, 
921 P.2d 122, 138 (Haw. 1996) (rejecting application of present sense impression 
exception to statements made some time after shooting when declarant flagged 
down police). 
 149. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 336 (describing jurisdictions that allow a 
time lapse “so long as it is short enough to exclude, negate, or negative the 
likelihood that the statement is the result of deliberation and reflection”). 
 150. See Thayer, supra note 30, at 72 (requiring that a statement, to be 
distinguished from hearsay, must be “concomitant with the principle act” and so 
connected “as to be regarded as the mere result and consequence of the coexisting 
motives” (citation omitted)). 
 151. Although it is not impossible for a declarant to game the timing system with 
e-hearsay, metadata should be available to help determine the actual timing of any 
assertion in the event of a dispute about timing.  See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 
241 F.R.D. 534, 548 (D. Md. 2007) (noting that metadata is a “useful tool for 
authenticating electronic records by use of distinctive characteristics”). 
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the e-hearsay.152  Finally, courts that have rejected near-
contemporaneous present sense impressions that appear conscious 
and deliberate, as opposed to reflexive and spontaneous, may view 
any e-hearsay with suspicion.153  Although the social media generation 
is admittedly quick on the draw when it comes to texting or tweeting, 
courts might find the act of composing a written message to an 
audience too deliberate to come within the spirit of the present sense 
impression exception.154  Indeed, one noted evidence scholar has 
suggested that trial judges should perform a “thought experiment” 
in considering present sense impression evidence and exclude 
statements “when the declarant would have had to deliberately 
process the information before uttering the proffered statement.”155  
The speed at which many can pull the trigger on a text 
notwithstanding, the process of composing a message suggests a 
degree of deliberation likely to fail such a thought experiment. 
Although not dictated by the requirements of Rule 803(1), some 
courts have rejected use of the present sense impression exception in 
cases where there is an indication that the declarant had some 
potential motive to shade or misrepresent the events at issue.156  
Courts engaging in this motivational analysis will likely continue in 
the context of e-hearsay.157  In cases involving a typical text message 
originating with one declarant and sent to a single recipient, courts 
are likely to analyze the motivational component with traditional 
concerns in mind.158  Courts can be expected to evaluate the 
                                                 
 152. State v. Damper, 225 P.3d 1148, 1150 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that text 
message was sent three minutes before defendant claimed he fled victim’s house 
after argument). 
 153. See Hallums v. United States, 841 A.2d 1270, 1277 (D.C. 2004) (stating that 
the present sense impression exception should not be used to admit statements that 
were not truly spontaneous and that involve conscious reflection or recall from 
memory). 
 154. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 345 (“When the thought process is 
complex, involving an intermediate step between the receipt of the present sense 
impression and the utterance, the utterance falls outside the ambit of Rule 
803(1).”).  But see Damper, 225 P.3d at 1152 n.3 (taking judicial notice of the speed 
with which a text message can be composed). 
 155. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 346. 
 156. See id. at 338–39 (describing federal and state applications of the present 
sense impression exception requiring “reliability” and rejecting present sense 
impressions otherwise consistent with the exception where declarant had a motive to 
falsify). 
 157. See Boyd v. City of Oakland, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1035–36 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(noting that “[m]otive or incentive to lie is an indicium of reliability,” and finding 
that “contemplation of litigation” and “anger” constituted motives to lie weighing 
against a finding of reliability); Fischer v. State, 252 S.W.3d 375, 385 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2008) (excluding a statement based on declarant’s motive to falsify). 
 158. See Boyd, 458 F. Supp. at 1036 (refusing to admit evidence of a conversation 
between two people due to the declarant’s motives to falsify). 
RICHTER.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 8/27/2012  12:18 PM 
2012] DON’T JUST DO SOMETHING! 1689 
relationship between the declarant and the recipient and the purpose 
of the message.159  Motivational issues in the case of e-present sense 
impressions to a mass audience may be more problematic.  In 
keeping with concerns about the deliberate nature of posting a tweet 
or a status update, courts may be skeptical of the motivations of a 
declarant who is communicating with a large audience electronically.  
Such motivational concerns, although not prescribed by Rule 803(1), 
may continue to limit admissibility of e-hearsay through the present 
sense impression in these jurisdictions. 
Courts historically have been extremely skeptical of “anonymous” 
present sense impressions.160  In attempting to establish the hearsay 
declarant’s personal knowledge, as required by Rule 803(1), courts 
necessarily inquire into the identity and location of the declarant at 
the time of the assertion.161  When hearsay statements are made by 
unidentified or anonymous bystanders, assessing personal knowledge 
and timing becomes more difficult and courts have been reluctant to 
allow  such anonymous assertions under the present sense impression 
exception.162  With the use of Twitter handles or Facebook identities 
unrelated to the real names of electronic declarants, courts are likely 
to reject assertions by unknown declarants for failure of the personal 
knowledge requirement.  To the extent that a declarant can be 
identified through his Twitter handle, however, the problem of 
personal knowledge could be made easier through use of geolocation 
                                                 
 159. See Fischer, 252 S.W.3d at 385 (rejecting trooper’s recorded present sense 
impression about a suspect’s performance on field sobriety tests due to officer’s 
motive to falsify the test results to advance the competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime). 
 160. See United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454, 461 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that 
declarant seeking to admit a statement by an unidentified declarant carries a 
“heavier burden”); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(1) and (2) advisory committee’s note 
(stating that courts are generally hesitant to admit statements by anonymous or 
unknown declarants). 
 161. See Brown v. Keane, 355 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The present sense 
impression exception applies only to reports of what the declarant has actually 
observed through the senses, not to what the declarant merely conjectures.”); see also 
5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
803.03[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2011) (“The proponent of evidence 
under Rule 803(1) must show that the declarant personally perceived the event or 
condition about which the statement was made.”). 
 162. See United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 1998) (detailing how 
an anonymous note failed to satisfy personal knowledge requirement); Miller v. 
Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding inadequate evidence of 
declarant’s personal knowledge).  But see Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F. 
Supp. 703, 706 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (finding by a preponderance of the evidence that 
unidentified caller observed the accident based upon corroborating circumstances); 
People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 374 (N.Y. 1993) (allowing present sense impression 
by 911 caller “Henry” where officer found circumstances at the scene that matched 
his description). 
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technology that locates a Twitter user at the time of a tweet.163  
Accordingly, under existing judicial interpretation of Rule 803(1), 
anonymous or unidentified e-hearsay is unlikely to flow freely into 
our trial process. 
Still other courts already add an extrinsic corroboration 
requirement to the existing requirements of Rule 803(1), demanding 
verification of the content of a present sense impression before 
admitting it into evidence.164  Some courts simply require 
“independent” evidence apart from the hearsay statement to support 
the content of the present sense impression, while others demand a 
specific type of corroboration by another percipient witness to the 
events.165  Jurisdictions taking such a strict view of traditional present 
sense impressions under existing Rule 803(1) are unlikely to accept 
uncorroborated e-hearsay into evidence without requiring some 
additional support.  A text message or tweet providing the only 
evidence of a disputed event without any independent showing of 
declarant’s personal knowledge and contemporaneous assertion will 
certainly be rejected by trial and appellate judges that read an 
independent corroboration requirement into the Rule. 
In sum, unreliable e-hearsay is unlikely to take over the trial 
process.  In light of the courts’ historical ability to adapt hearsay rules 
to constantly evolving human communication platforms, we may have 
confidence that judges will respond with appropriate care to the next 
generation of present sense impression evidence online.  As outlined 
above, existing protections in the Federal Rules framework will guard 
against indiscriminate admission of e-present sense impressions.  
Further, the historic judicial resistance to the present sense 
impression portends little judicial tolerance for uncorroborated and 
unreliable e-present sense impressions.  Thus, there is no urgent 
need to amend Rule 803(1) to close the door on casual social media 
                                                 
 163. See About the Tweet Location Feature, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/ 
groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/111-features/articles/78525-
aboutthetweetlocationfeature (last visited June 14, 2012) (describing “[t]weeting 
with . . . location,” which allows Twitter users to add location information to their 
tweets). 
 164. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 303 (3d Cir. 
1983) (noting that the exception is generally understood to require some 
corroborating testimony), rev’d sub. nom. on other grounds by Matsushita Elect. Indus. 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); People v. Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d 1328, 
1334 (N.Y. 1996) (requiring “some independent verification of the declarant’s 
descriptions of the unfolding events”); see also Imwinkelried, supra note 6, at 351–54 
(noting judicial additions of independent corroboration and equally percipient 
witness requirements to present sense impression). 
 165. Compare People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 909–10 (Mich. 1998) 
(requiring extrinsic corroboration of the present sense impression), with State v. 
Case, 676 P.2d 241, 245 (N.M. 1984) (requiring an equally percipient witness). 
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chatter. 
II. THE CRAWFORD REVOLUTION AND THE PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION 
Professor Bellin also posits that the recent revolution in 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence creates an urgent need for 
amendment of the present sense impression exception.166  In 2004, 
the Supreme Court turned Sixth Amendment analysis of hearsay 
upside down with its decision in Crawford v. Washington.167  In 
Crawford, the Court discarded the long-standing “adequate indicia of 
reliability” test for admitting hearsay against a criminal defendant, 
outlined 24 years earlier in Ohio v. Roberts.168  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Scalia announced a new paradigm for Confrontation Clause 
analysis of hearsay statements.169  Under Crawford, Confrontation 
Clause protections apply only to “testimonial” hearsay statements.170  
Although the Court continues to struggle with the contours of the 
“testimonial” category, Crawford described “testimonial” statements 
as those hearsay “statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial.”171  Statements 
made to assist law enforcement agents in the investigation of a past 
crime are within the core of the testimonial category, although the 
Court has held that statements made to assist law enforcement 
officers responding to an “ongoing emergency” are not 
testimonial.172 
In support of the new standard, Justice Scalia explained that the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees one procedure to test the accuracy of 
testimonial statements offered against an accused.  According to 
Crawford, the Confrontation Clause promises a defendant the 
                                                 
 166. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 357–61 (noting the “vanishing” constitutional 
limits on admission of the present sense impression). 
 167. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 168. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69, abrogating Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 169. See id. (“[T]he Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:  
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”). 
 170. See id. (articulating Sixth Amendment demands for “testimonial” evidence); 
see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 810, 824 (2006) (holding that Sixth 
Amendment protections extend only to “testimonial” hearsay statements). 
 171. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (citation omitted).  The Court acknowledged 
concerns regarding its failure to “articulate a comprehensive definition” of the 
testimonial category, but stated that the term covers preliminary hearing testimony, 
grand jury testimony, trial testimony, and police interrogations, at a minimum.  Id. at 
68 & n.10. 
 172. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828–29 (holding that statements made to meet “an 
ongoing emergency” are not testimonial but that statements in response to 
“structured police questioning” are testimonial (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 
n.4)). 
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opportunity to cross-examine those who give testimony against him 
and no substitute for that process of cross-examination is 
constitutionally acceptable.173  Crawford, therefore, articulates the 
ultimate preference for live testimony, allowing “testimonial” hearsay 
to be admitted against a criminal defendant only if the declarant is 
“unavailable” for trial and the defendant had a previous opportunity 
to cross-examine.174  If the declarant is available and testifies at trial 
and is subject to cross-examination, his “testimonial” hearsay 
statements are also constitutionally permissible.175  The insistence 
upon cross-examination of all “testimonial” hearsay under Crawford 
has had the effect of excluding un-cross-examined hearsay statements 
by absent declarants in criminal cases that were previously admissible 
under the Supreme Court’s Ohio v. Roberts Confrontation Clause 
analysis.176 
In developing the contours of the Sixth Amendment mandate 
following Crawford, the Supreme Court has made clear that there is 
no constitutional barrier to the admission of hearsay statements that 
are “nontestimonial” in nature.177  Employing an originalist 
interpretation, Justice Scalia found that the framers of the 
Constitution designed the Confrontation Clause with an eye toward 
preventing admission of out-of-court witness statements and 
testimony as a substitute for live, confronted trial testimony.178  
Hearsay statements outside this “testimonial” category, therefore, 
were not the aim of the clause and are free from its control.179  In the 
wake of the Crawford reformation, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
provide the only safeguard against admission of “nontestimonial” 
hearsay statements against a criminal defendant in the federal 
system.180 
                                                 
 173. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69 (“Where testimonial statements are at issue, the 
only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the 
Constitution actually prescribes:  confrontation.”). 
 174. Id. at 68. 
 175. Id. at 59 n.9. 
 176. See id. at 64–65 (identifying a series of federal cases in which the courts relied 
on Roberts to admit testimonial statements that had not been subject to cross-
examination). 
 177. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 824 (explaining that statements not clearly involving 
testimony are not controlled by the Confrontation Clause). 
 178. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 (arguing that the only exceptions to the 
Confrontation Clause that should be considered are the exceptions that were 
“established at the time of the founding”). 
 179. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 824 (noting that statements not considered 
“testimonial” fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause); Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 51 (indicating that nontestimonial statements do not require the protection that 
the Confrontation Clause offers). 
 180. Davis, 547 U.S. at 824.  Following Davis’s express removal of Sixth 
Amendment protection from nontestimonial hearsay, some state courts have 
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Within the Crawford framework, Professor Bellin suggests that most, 
if not all present sense impressions will, by definition, fall into the 
nontestimonial category because they describe ongoing events and 
cannot relate past occurrences in the way a witness giving testimony 
does.181  For nontestimonial present sense impressions, evidentiary 
rules now offer the only protection against admissibility.182  Professor 
Bellin argues that the Federal Rules of Evidence must respond by 
adding more stringent protections to prevent admission of 
nontestimonial present sense impressions against criminal 
defendants.183  For several reasons, Rule 803(1) need not be 
amended to close constitutional gaps in protection.  Further, adding 
a percipient witness requirement to the present sense impression 
would eliminate one of the few remaining sources of admissible 
hearsay in the domestic violence prosecutions that have already 
suffered significantly in Crawford’s wake. 
A. The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Sixth Amendment Part Ways 
To suggest that the Federal Rules of Evidence need to make up for 
perceived inadequacies in constitutional protection in the wake of 
Crawford is directly at odds with one of the principal policies 
underlying the Crawford Confrontation Clause revolution.  Under the 
long-standing Roberts test for admission of hearsay against a criminal 
defendant, the Federal Rules of Evidence played a prominent role.184  
Under Roberts, the Sixth Amendment was interpreted to permit 
hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant when that hearsay 
demonstrated adequate “indicia of reliability.”185  The Court held 
that such constitutionally mandated reliability could be “inferred 
without more” in a case where the hearsay evidence fell within “a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception.”186  Over time, the Court designated 
                                                 
continued to apply the protection of the Roberts doctrine to nontestimonial 
statements pursuant to confrontation protections embodied in state constitutions.  
See, e.g., State v. Camacho, 924 A.2d 99, 116 (Conn. 2007) (applying Roberts to 
nontestimonial declaration against interest); State v. Kaufman, 711 S.E.2d 607, 621 
(W. Va. 2011) (“[N]ontestimonial statements may be admissible in a criminal trial if 
it is shown that the witness was unavailable for trial, and that the witness’s statement 
bore adequate indicia of reliability.”). 
 181. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 358 (“[P]resent sense impressions will likely never 
be testimonial.”). 
 182. Davis, 547 U.S. at 824. 
 183. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 358 (arguing that Crawford “actually makes present 
sense impressions easier for prosecutors to admit”). 
 184. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (permitting inference of reliability 
where “evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception”). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. The Court also held that the Confrontation Clause normally requires a 
showing of unavailability, id., but suggested in a footnote that unavailability is not 
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many hearsay exceptions as “firmly rooted” for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment analysis.187  Even hearsay not admissible through firmly 
rooted exceptions could be admitted against a criminal defendant if 
it demonstrated “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”188  In 
examining particularized guarantees of trustworthiness for purposes 
of the Sixth Amendment analysis, courts often drew upon 
requirements for admission of hearsay under evidentiary rules.189  In 
the era in which Roberts reigned, therefore, the rules of evidence had 
the power to drive the constitutional analysis.190  Under Roberts, 
therefore, the Federal Rules of Evidence bore a significant 
responsibility to protect constitutional safeguards, as well as other 
adversarial tenets. 
Following Crawford, the Sixth Amendment analysis has been 
severed from any analysis of evidentiary rules.  Indeed, Justice Scalia 
expressly rejected any connection between the Confrontation Clause 
and rules of evidence, giving the Sixth Amendment power and 
significance independent of trial rules.191  Under this new 
confrontation paradigm, therefore, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
must serve concerns of a fair and rational trial process, but need not 
erect constitutionally important barriers to admissibility in criminal 
cases.192  While the hearsay rules should not admit evidence the 
Constitution prohibits, they need not exclude evidence the 
Constitution permits, absent some compelling justification.  Where 
Crawford has eliminated Sixth Amendment protection for 
nontestimonial statements, there is no constitutional need to create 
                                                 
always required, id. at 65 n.7. 
 187. See id. at 66 n.8 (approving hearsay admitted through former testimony 
exception, dying declarations exception and public and business records 
exceptions); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n.8 (1992) (noting wide 
acceptance and historical roots of excited utterances and hearsay statements made 
for purposes of medical treatment); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 
(1987) (noting that the co-conspirator exception is firmly rooted). 
 188. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 189. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (holding that in evaluating 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, courts must consider “circumstances 
that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly 
worthy of belief”). 
 190. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (“[C]ertain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid 
foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the 
‘substance of the constitutional protection.’”). 
 191. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“Where testimonial 
statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth 
Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence . . . .”). 
 192. Indeed, this state of affairs appears consistent with the original intentions of 
the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence.  See FED. R. EVID. 803 
advisory committee’s note (explaining that “a hearsay rule can function usefully as 
an adjunct to the confrontation right in constitutional areas and independently in 
non-constitutional areas”). 
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more stringent requirements.193  In fact, the stand-alone Crawford 
approach to hearsay to some extent may relieve the rule-making 
process from constitutional concerns because the Federal Rules of 
Evidence no longer serve as the constitutional watchdog for hearsay 
statements offered against criminal defendants.194  Because Crawford 
eliminates any connection between the rules and the Constitution, 
the Crawford revolution may make stringent requirements in 
evidentiary rules for the protection of Sixth Amendment concerns less 
necessary than they were in the Roberts era, rather than more so. 
Furthermore, it appears that Crawford’s non-protection of 
nontestimonial hearsay will result in little real change in the 
procedure for admitting present sense impressions against criminal 
defendants.  During the Roberts era, the Supreme Court never 
decided whether the present sense impression exception to the 
hearsay rule was “firmly rooted” for purposes of Sixth Amendment 
analysis.195  The majority of lower courts that addressed the issue, 
however, found the present sense impression “firmly rooted” as a 
result of its historic connection to the excited utterance and the res 
gestae category of hearsay exceptions.196  Thus, in these jurisdictions, 
hearsay could automatically be offered against an accused if it fell 
within the present sense impression exception under the rules of 
evidence and no further constitutional inquiry was required.197 
Under Crawford, testimonial present sense impressions will be 
                                                 
 193. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 (2006) (noting that testimonial 
hearsay marks out not only the “core” of constitutional concerns, but its “perimeter” 
as well). 
 194. The hearsay rules were drafted to avoid tension with the mandate of the 
Confrontation Clause.  See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 66 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(recognizing the Advisory Committee’s awareness that the Confrontation Clause and 
the Federal Rules of Evidence function separately).  Erecting higher barriers to 
admission than are required by the constitution is unnecessary to this purpose.    
 195. See Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F.3d 300, 302–03 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(recognizing that the question of whether a present sense impression is firmly rooted 
“remains open”). 
 196. See United States v. Walton, 323 F. App’x 837, 842 (11th Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam) (finding present sense impression firmly-rooted because “res gestae is a 
historic concept that embodies declarations of present sense impressions”); United 
States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Jones, 
299 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Vega, 883 F.2d 1025 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349–50 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(same), vacated in part on other grounds, 686 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); 
Welch v. Sirmons, No. 00-CV-0105-CVE-PJC, 2007 WL 927950, at *10 (N.D. Okla. 
2007) (same); Wooten v. Cluff, 69 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (West) 863, 866 (D. Ariz. 2006) 
(same); Reedus v. Stegall, 197 F. Supp. 2d 767, 777 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (same); People 
v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 910 (Mich. 1998) (same). 
 197. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 121, § 252, at 161 (“[U]nder 
Roberts, hearsay falling within a traditional or ‘firmly rooted’ exception that does not 
require unavailability was automatically admitted under the Confrontation Clause.”). 
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excluded absent an opportunity for the accused to cross-examine the 
declarant, regardless of the applicability of the evidentiary rule.198  
Thus, Crawford increased protection of criminal defendants in the 
testimonial context.  In the context of nontestimonial hearsay only, 
courts will be permitted to admit present sense impressions that 
satisfy evidentiary rules, just as they did under Roberts by classifying 
the present sense impression as “firmly rooted.”199  In the majority of 
jurisdictions, therefore, the automatic admission of nontestimonial 
present sense impressions against an accused under Crawford 
represents no change in the level of protection afforded in the Roberts 
era. 
Not all courts classified the present sense impression exception as 
“firmly rooted” under Roberts, however.  Because of the common law 
rejection of the present sense impression, at least the Ninth Circuit 
declined to classify it as “firmly rooted” for purposes of Ohio v. 
Roberts.200  Therefore, prior to Crawford, a trial judge in this 
jurisdiction would have conducted two distinct inquiries before 
admitting a present sense impression into evidence against an 
accused.  First, the judge would determine that the hearsay statement 
met the requirements for admission under the evidentiary rules.  
Even if the statement qualified for admission under the rules, the 
judge would then have to determine that the statement in question 
displayed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness before allowing 
it into evidence.201  With a nontestimonial present sense impression 
after Crawford, the hearsay statement may be allowed with no further 
inquiry if Rule 803(1) permits admission.  To the extent that they 
                                                 
 198. Some present sense impressions may fit into the testimonial category and will 
have to satisfy the Crawford cross-examination requirement prior to admission.  See 
United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (admitting, as a present sense 
impression, statements made over a walkie-talkie by testifying police officer to 
another officer); United States v. Campbell, 782 F. Supp. 1258, 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1991) 
(finding that a police officer’s recorded statements to dispatcher during pursuit were 
present sense impressions).  Even in the context of nontestimonial statements, courts 
have carefully reviewed trial courts’ admission of hearsay evidence against criminal 
defendants.  See, e.g., State v. Kaufman, 711 S.E.2d 607, 624 (W. Va. 2011) (reversing 
defendant’s conviction due to admission of victim’s diary, notwithstanding its 
nontestimonial character). 
 199. Reedus, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 777. 
 200. See United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness requirement in light of absence of case-
law classifying the present sense impression as firmly rooted); Guam v. Ignacio, 10 
F.3d 608, 614 (9th Cir. 1993) (declining to decide whether the present sense 
impression is firmly rooted and applying particularized guarantees of trustworthiness 
test); Boyd v. City of Oakland, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(suggesting that present sense impressions are not firmly rooted). 
 201. See, e.g., Boyd, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 1033 (requiring particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness). 
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have lost the benefit of a separate analysis of trustworthiness, criminal 
defendants, in theory, enjoy less protection against admission of 
nontestimonial present sense impressions than they had prior to 
Crawford, at least in the Ninth Circuit.202 
To argue that criminal defendants are entitled to greater 
protection against the admission of nontestimonial statements, 
however, is simply to chafe against Crawford’s 
testimonial/nontestimonial distinction and the lack of constitutional 
protection extended to nontestimonial hearsay in Crawford’s brave 
new world of confrontation.  To be sure, there is a raging debate 
about the merits of Crawford, the validity and viability of the 
testimonial category, as well as the non-protection for statements 
outside that category.203  Any concerns regarding criminal 
defendants’ legitimate need for greater protection than that afforded 
by the prevailing interpretation of the Sixth Amendment ought to be 
addressed within the context of that larger debate.204 
In the meantime, Rule 803(1) should not be amended to create 
obstacles to the admission of present sense impressions against 
criminal defendants unless it is shown that the existing requirements 
are inadequate to ensure a fair and rational trial process.  To suggest 
that Crawford has made the present sense impression inadequately 
protective of criminal defendants is to suggest that the drafters of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence sanctioned an unreliable hearsay 
exception, counting on the Sixth Amendment to intervene to achieve 
a fair result in criminal cases.  Such a suggestion is at odds with the 
design and operation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.205  As detailed 
above, the current rule allows only a narrow category of hearsay 
statements made by a declarant while observing an event or condition 
                                                 
 202. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004) (noting absence of any 
meaningful protection for defendants under Roberts). 
 203. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation as Constitutional Criminal Procedure:  
Crawford’s Birth Did Not Require that Roberts Had to Die, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 685, 693 
(2007) (explaining that Crawford’s procedural requirements are overly strict); 
Orenstein, supra note 16, at 162 (arguing that Crawford’s focus on testimonial 
statements only left defendants vulnerable to several other kinds of hearsay).  But see 
Ariana J. Torchin, Note, A Multidimensional Framework for the Analysis of Testimonial 
Hearsay Under Crawford v. Washington, 94 GEO. L.J. 581, 584–85 (2006) (arguing that 
Crawford helped to clarify the inconsistencies created by the reliability test in Roberts). 
 204. Many courts continue to apply Roberts analysis to nontestimonial hearsay 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s holding that the Sixth Amendment requires 
no such analysis.  See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(“Where a hearsay statement is found to be nontestimonial, we continue to evaluate 
the declaration under Ohio v. Roberts.”). 
 205. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing the well-recognized 
distinction between the Confrontation Clause and the Federal Rules of Evidence).   
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or immediately thereafter, describing the event or condition.206  Trial 
and appellate courts carefully police these requirements and admit 
present sense impressions somewhat sparingly.207  Accordingly, the 
protections the current requirements afford against indiscriminate 
admission of present sense impressions are significant.208  Although 
Crawford creates its own constitutional testifying witness requirement 
for previously uncross-examined testimonial hearsay, it demands no 
such protection in the context of a nontestimonial present sense 
impression.209  The Federal Rules of Evidence need not alter a now 
time-honored exception to the hearsay rule to impose requirements 
beyond those constitutionally mandated. 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
remains in flux.  The Court’s most recent confrontation installments 
in Michigan v. Bryant,210  and Williams v. Illinois,211 have revealed 
significant discord on the Court regarding the future interpretation 
of Crawford and the contours of the Confrontation Clause in the 
context of hearsay.212  As discussed further in Part III, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence should not be amended in the wake of every shift 
in constitutional analysis from the high Court.  Before adapting 
evidentiary rules to complement the Supreme Court’s Confrontation 
Clause analysis, rule-makers would benefit from further clarification 
from the Court. 
B. Domestic Violence and Present Sense Impressions 
Amending the present sense impression exception to require a 
testifying percipient witness in the wake of Crawford is not simply 
without justification.  Rather, such an amendment would have 
collateral consequences that will harm the adversarial process as it 
exists post-Crawford.  Adding a percipient witness requirement to Rule 
                                                 
 206. See supra Part I.A (describing the basic requirements for qualification as a 
present sense impression). 
 207. See supra Part I.D.1 (considering reasons why trial and appellate courts will 
regulate admission of e-hearsay under the existing requirements of the present sense 
impression exception). 
 208. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text (highlighting the safeguards 
inherent in the rule). 
 209. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 689 (2004) (allowing states to use their 
discretion when developing hearsay laws relating to nontestimonial statements). 
 210. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 211. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 212. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2265 (Kagan, J. dissenting) (explaining that “five 
justices specifically reject every aspect of [the plurality opinion’s] reasoning and 
every paragraph of its explication.”); Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J. dissenting) 
(stating that the majority opinion “distorts our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence 
and leaves it in a shambles,” and that “[i]nstead of clarifying the law, the Court 
makes itself the obfuscator of last resort”). 
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803(1) would close one of the last remaining constitutionally 
appropriate avenues for admitting victim hearsay in domestic 
violence prosecutions. 
As many scholars have noted, the Crawford shift in Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence has had a significant impact on domestic 
violence prosecutions.213  In that class of cases, victims often fail to 
appear at trial to testify live against their abusers subject to cross-
examination.214  Under the Roberts regime, the hearsay statements of 
absent domestic violence victims were admitted through firmly 
rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule or when the statements 
displayed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.215  Under 
Crawford, however, the same testimonial hearsay statements to law 
enforcement personnel reporting violence must be excluded from 
trial in the absence of some opportunity for cross-examination of a 
truly unavailable victim before trial.216  For the same reasons that it is 
challenging to obtain trial testimony from victims of domestic 
violence, it is likewise difficult to ensure adequate cross-examination 
prior to trial. 
Although the Supreme Court suggested that the doctrine of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing would pave the way for admission of hearsay 
statements by intimidated domestic violence victims, the Court 
subsequently interpreted the forfeiture doctrine narrowly to apply 
only in cases where a defendant “intentionally” engages in 
wrongdoing for the “purpose” of preventing the victim’s trial 
testimony.217  While domestic violence victims may be reluctant to 
                                                 
 213. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 810, 832 (2006) (“Respondents in both 
cases, joined by a number of their amici, contend that the nature of the offenses 
charged in these two cases—domestic violence—requires greater flexibility in the 
use of testimonial evidence.”); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers after Crawford, 91 
VA. L. REV. 747, 768 (2005) (explaining that Crawford has had an especially large 
impact on domestic violence cases due to accusers’ frequent refusal to cooperate 
with the prosecution during trial). 
 214. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 405 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(noting that domestic violence “is difficult to prove in court because the victim is 
generally reluctant or unable to testify”). 
 215. See Lininger, supra note 213, at 756 (recounting the requirements for 
admitting hearsay statements under Roberts); Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and 
the Children Too:  Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 311, 320 (2005) (“Roberts provides a cost-free pro forma stamp of 
approval for all firmly rooted hearsay of unavailable declarants.”). 
 216. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 377 (reversing the admission of testimonial victim 
hearsay through California hearsay exception absent a finding of the defendant’s 
intent to prevent victim’s trial testimony as a necessary condition for forfeiture of 
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation); Davis, 547 U.S. at 834 (excluding 
“testimonial” victim statement admitted as excited utterance absent finding of 
forfeiture). 
 217. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 406 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (opining that “the Court 
breaks the promise implicit” in Davis concerning application of forfeiture doctrine 
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testify against their attackers for a variety of reasons, it is often 
difficult for a prosecutor to prove intentional intimidation for the 
purposes of preventing testimony.218  Because of the nature of 
domestic violence, there is often inadequate evidence without the 
victim’s reports to prove the crime.219  Therefore, the Crawford regime 
has made it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to prosecute 
domestic offenders in a large class of cases.220 
In the wake of Crawford, courts have found present sense 
impressions and excited utterances reporting ongoing domestic 
attacks to 911 operators, other rescue personnel, and friends and 
neighbors to be nontestimonial under the Supreme Court’s 
“ongoing emergency” doctrine outlined in Davis v. Washington.221  
Thus, these present sense impressions have been admitted in 
domestic violence prosecutions consistent with the demands of the 
Sixth Amendment articulated by Crawford and have allowed some 
level of continued enforcement in this important area.222  Amending 
                                                 
in domestic violence prosecutions); Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 (noting that domestic 
violence victims are “notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion” and that 
the “Sixth Amendment does not require courts to acquiesce” when defendants 
intimidate victims). 
 218. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing “serious practical 
evidentiary problems” in applying purposeful intimidation standard of forfeiture and 
posing query:  “Who knows precisely what passed through H’s mind at the critical 
moment?”).  But see State v. Fry, 926 N.E.2d 1239, 1262 (Ohio 2010) (admitting 
victim’s testimonial statements to police after finding that defendant forfeited his 
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by calling the victim from jail, coercing her 
to drop charges, and threatening her if she did not do so).   
 219. See supra note 213. 
 220. See Orenstein, supra note 16 (declaring that Crawford “has profoundly 
affected domestic violence cases, making it much harder to prosecute them 
successfully”). 
 221. Indeed, Justice Scalia noted in Giles that nontestimonial victim statements 
would remain an important source of evidence in the domestic violence context after 
Crawford.  Giles, 554 U.S. at 376; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 332–33 
(noting that present sense impressions “often take the form of 911 calls in domestic 
violence cases” and that admissibility of 911 calls as present sense impressions can be 
determinative “[g]iven the tendency of domestic violence victims to recant”). 
 222. See, e.g., Davis, 547 U.S. at 821, 834 (affirming the admission of 
nontestimonial excited utterance in domestic violence trial); United States v. Davis, 
577 F.3d 660, 670 (6th Cir. 2009) (allowing 911 caller’s statements admitted as 
present sense impression and finding no Crawford violation); United States v. Arnold, 
486 F.3d 177, 189 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding 911 call to be nontestimonial under 
Crawford, using excited utterance exception); United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 
844 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding 911 call fit present sense impression and was 
nontestimonial); United States v. Kuo, No. 10-CR-671 (S-1) (KAM), 2011 WL 145471, 
at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2011) (finding 911 present sense impressions nontestimonial 
in context of non-domestic assault); Compan v. People, 121 P.3d 876, 886 (Colo. 
2005) (finding excited utterances nontestimonial and admissible in domestic 
violence prosecution); see also United States v. Price, 58 F. App’x 105, 106 (6th Cir. 
2003) (finding, pre-Crawford, that a child’s 911 call reporting that “[m]y dad has a 
gun and is trying to shoot my mom” as a present sense impression); United States v. 
Jackson, 124 F.3d 607, 618 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding, pre-Crawford, that a mother’s 
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the hearsay exception for the present sense impression to make its 
requirements more stringent—and specifically amending it to 
require a testifying percipient witness in all cases—promises to 
eliminate the utility of one of the last remaining sources of 
constitutionally competent evidence in domestic violence cases.  
Assuming that a victim makes a hearsay report to an absent 911 
operator during or immediately following an attack where only the 
victim and the abuser are present, there will be no percipient witness 
to corroborate the victim’s hearsay report as a condition of 
admissibility.  Even if the 911 operator receiving the call could 
perceive the noise of a domestic disturbance during the call, that 
operator would be unable to confirm the identity of the attacker or 
the sequence of events from personal knowledge.  Of course, the 
issues of identity and sequence of events would be the most salient in 
a domestic violence prosecution.  With an added percipient witness 
requirement, therefore, the victim’s statements to the absent 911 
operator during this emergency call would be inadmissible under the 
present sense impression exception and unavailable in the 
prosecution of the alleged offender. 
Further, the e-hearsay that is the purported catalyst for a percipient 
witness amendment may be a crucial source of constitutionally 
competent evidence in domestic violence cases.  The culture of 
instant communication with hand-held devices allows otherwise 
isolated victims to reach out to remote friends and neighbors during 
an attack quickly and easily with an e-mail, phone call, or text 
message.  When a victim is dead or otherwise unavailable at a trial 
arising out of the encounter, this contemporaneous window into the 
events as they unfolded may provide powerful evidence that the 
victim cannot.  Requiring a percipient witness within Rule 803(1) will 
close the door on this valuable evidence. 
The Arizona case of State v. Damper223 illustrates the potential 
importance of e-present sense impressions in the domestic violence 
context.224  In that case, Marcus Damper was convicted of the second-
degree murder of his girlfriend.225  Although the defendant admitted 
shooting the victim in her bed during a disagreement, he claimed 
that the shooting was accidental.  Moments before the fatal shooting, 
however, a text message was sent from the victim’s phone to her 
                                                 
statements to responders were present sense impressions). 
 223. 225 P.3d 1148 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). 
 224. See id. at 1150 (admitting into evidence a text message sent by the victim 
under the present sense impression rule). 
 225. Id. 
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friend stating, in essence, “Can you come over?  Me and Marcus are 
fighting and I have no gas.”226 
The defendant objected to the admission of this text message at 
trial as a present sense impression.227  Damper argued that the text 
violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, was inadmissible 
hearsay, and was inadequately authenticated prior to its admission.228  
The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s arguments 
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, finding that, whether the text was 
an “urgent cry for help” or a “casual request to a friend,” it was 
nontestimonial within the Crawford framework.229  Further, the court 
held that the text was properly admitted as a present sense 
impression because it related an event of which the victim had 
personal knowledge—her argument with the defendant.230  The 
court also looked to the timing of the text, as well as the victim’s use 
of the present tense in the text to decide that the text was created 
and sent during the argument or shortly thereafter.231  Finally, the 
court found adequate evidence to authenticate the text as having 
come from the victim to justify its admission.232  Thus, the admission 
of the text message was affirmed and Damper’s conviction upheld.233 
The text message in Damper presents a classic example of the type 
of e-hearsay that may aid in the prosecution of domestic abuse 
consistent with the mandate of Crawford, that would be foreclosed by 
a percipient witness requirement.  With an isolated victim like the 
deceased girlfriend in Damper, there will be no trial witness capable of 
corroborating the unavailable victim’s version of events.  Although 
Professor Bellin suggests that remote declarants like the victim in 
Damper can “video chat” to allow contemporaneous perception by 
another witness, this remedy is plainly unrealistic in this context.234  
Further, the victim’s text message was within the core of the reliability 
justification for present sense impressions where there was ample 
                                                 
 226. Id.  The text was written “part in Spanish and text lingo,” but was translated 
by the recipient, as well as a police detective.  Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1150–51. 
 229. Id. at 1151. 
 230. Id. at 1152. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 1153 (pointing to the fact that the text came from the victim’s 
programmed number, the fact that the phone used to send the text was discovered 
next to the victim’s body, and finally, that there was no evidence that anyone other 
than the victim had access to the phone to send the text). 
 233. Id. 
 234. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 371 n.140 (“In a more modern context, this would 
permit present sense observations communicated, for example, during a video chat, 
where the person who relays the observation to the jury was viewing a similar 
(virtual) reality as the declarant at the time of the statement.”). 
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evidence to support the requirements of Rule 803(1) apart from the 
text message itself.  Although Damper characterized his interaction 
with the victim more benignly, he conceded that he and the victim 
had some discussion or disagreement on the morning of her death 
during which he shot her.235  The victim clearly had personal 
knowledge of her own discussion with the defendant, demonstrating 
the first-hand information necessary to satisfy Rule 803(1).  Further, 
it was clear that the text was sent contemporaneously with the 
argument that the victim was describing due to the timing of the text, 
as well as her use of the present tense in the text itself.  Finally, the 
victim was found dead in her bed with her cell phone at her side.236 
Such reliable e-hearsay can offer an invaluable and constitutionally 
sound window into domestic attacks that are often perpetrated 
without witnesses standing by.  Existing requirements of Rule 803(1) 
will prevent admission of wholly uncorroborated accusations even 
without Sixth Amendment oversight.  To amend the Federal Rules of 
Evidence to foreclose the use of reliable and constitutionally 
permissible evidence of vital importance in the domestic violence 
context would close one of the few remaining avenues for allowing 
victims’ voices to be heard. 
C. Civil Cases 
Finally, to the extent that addition of a percipient witness 
requirement to Rule 803(1) constitutes a reaction to Crawford, it 
represents an overly broad solution.  Federal Rule of Evidence 803 
defines twenty-three hearsay exceptions available in both criminal 
and civil federal proceedings.237  An amendment to Rule 803(1) to 
add a percipient witness requirement, therefore, will affect the 
admission of present sense impressions in civil cases, as well as against 
the accused in criminal prosecutions.  Such a broad amendment to a 
hearsay exception applicable in both the criminal and civil context 
will eliminate valuable evidence offered outside the criminal context.  
To the extent that any amendment to Rule 803(1) is justified by 
Crawford and its progeny, the amendment should be narrowly tailored 
to address this concern. 
                                                 
 235. Indeed, the text message did not necessarily accuse defendant of any 
wrongdoing.  It did not say Marcus is “hitting me” or “threatening me with a gun.”  
Rather, it stated that the victim and Marcus were “fighting.”  Id. at 1150. 
 236. Id. at 1153. 
 237. FED. R. EVID. 803. 
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III. THE CASE FOR CAUTION 
As outlined in Parts I and II above, there is no urgent need to 
amend the present sense impression exception to account for e-
hearsay.  Should rule-makers consider a proposal to amend the 
exception, however, such a proposal should be approached with 
caution for several reasons.  The timing and scope of any e-hearsay 
project should be carefully considered.  A hasty or piecemeal 
modification of a single hearsay exception to account for changing 
norms of communication could create more problems than it 
resolves.  To the extent that amendments to the present sense 
impression exception are considered, a percipient witness 
requirement should not be adopted.  Requiring a percipient witness 
would undermine the utility of the exception and is at odds with the 
fundamental purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence to achieve 
accurate and fair fact-finding.238  Should rule-makers decide to 
consider a revision, there are several possible alternatives to a 
percipient witness requirement that would better serve the intended 
purpose of the present sense impression, while providing a measure 
of security against unreliable e-hearsay. 
A. Haste Makes Waste 
To the extent that rule-makers wish to consider amending the 
present sense impression exception, any amendment aimed at e-
hearsay appears premature at this point in the development of the 
social-media revolution.  Courts and litigants have substantial 
experience in adapting hearsay rules to constantly evolving methods 
of communication.239  Consistent with the strong common law 
tradition that serves as the foundation for the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, trial and appellate judges should be given the first 
opportunity to address e-hearsay problems under existing doctrine.  
Indeed, courts are only beginning to issue rulings dealing with 
admissibility of text messages and the like.240  There appears to be no 
reported case deciding admissibility of a tweet as a present sense 
impression. 
Rule-makers should allow courts time to develop methodology for 
                                                 
 238. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to 
administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and 
promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and 
securing a just determination.”). 
 239. See supra Part I (discussing constant evolution of human communication that 
must be addressed by hearsay doctrine). 
 240. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 350 n.73 (collecting cases). 
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evaluating e-hearsay under the present sense impression exception 
before charging in to correct a potentially non-existent problem.  If 
judges continue to carefully control admission of present sense 
impressions, there will be no need to alter the framework for the 
exception.  If, however, courts appear unable to filter social-media 
and other e-hearsay using existing tools and tweets, texts, and status 
updates begin flooding the trial process with little restriction, rule-
makers can act to correct the problem.  By allowing courts time to 
handle e-hearsay in the first instance, drafters of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence may marshal valuable data regarding problem areas to 
inform any future amendment.  Rule-makers could examine 
inconsistencies and infirmities in judicial opinions allowing e-hearsay 
and use perceived patterns to craft an amendment that will directly 
resolve genuine problems.  Although technological progress moves at 
lightning speed, the rule-making process may benefit from a more 
measured pace. 
Finally, to the extent that rule-makers are concerned that the 
social-media revolution could require reconsideration of the present 
sense impression, they should allow sufficient time for the electronic 
communication revolution to reach a point of relative stability before 
re-writing the exception.  There can be no doubt that modern 
communication capabilities represent a moving target.  New 
platforms for electronic communication emerge on an almost daily 
basis at this juncture in wireless communication development.241  In 
order to craft revisions to the exception that adequately account for 
emerging methods of on-line communication, rule-makers should 
allow time for further development of technology and electronic 
communications to avoid drafting an amendment that is moot or 
inadequate before its effective date.242 
B. Piecemeal Amendments to Hearsay Exceptions 
In considering possible amendments to hearsay rules to account 
for evolving electronic modes of communication, rule-makers should 
carefully consider the scope and breadth of such an undertaking.  
Drafters should be wary of amending a single hearsay exception like 
the present sense impression without carefully considering the 
                                                 
 241. See, e.g., Hossain, supra note 56 (describing “CrimePush” as new app available 
on iTunes to report ongoing crime with the push of a button). 
 242. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 537 (D. Md. 2007) (noting 
that e-discovery revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has “only 
heightened, not lessened” the discussion of discovery of electronically stored 
information). 
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ramifications of e-hearsay for the rest of Article Eight.  The hearsay 
exceptions have a somewhat symbiotic relationship that requires a 
holistic assessment of all hearsay exceptions within the Federal Rules 
of Evidence before any attempt is made to revise or amend 
exceptions to account for the rise of social media.  Revising hearsay 
exceptions individually to account for broad-reaching developments 
like technology and evolving Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
threatens to be inefficient, to create collateral consequences with 
respect to unrevised exceptions, and to create ever-expanding 
labyrinthine hearsay rules.  Hearsay already suffers from the greatest 
complexity within the Federal Rules of Evidence and has drawn 
constant attacks from scholars, practitioners, judges, and law students 
alike.243  Piecemeal amendment promises to exacerbate this problem. 
While the culture of social media, with its emphasis on constant 
publication of ongoing activities, certainly has special significance for 
the present sense impression exception, other hearsay exceptions are 
certain to be affected by the rise of e-hearsay.244  Excited utterances 
covered by Rule 803(2) raise “bootstrapping” concerns reminiscent 
of those involved in interpreting the present sense impression that 
could arise in the e-hearsay context.  A text or tweet could relate to a 
startling event and even describe it to social media followers.  A court 
could conceivably find that the nature of the event described was 
“startling” within the meaning of the excited utterance exception 
                                                 
 243. See Ronald J. Allen, Commentary:  A Response to Professor Friedman:  The Evolution 
of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 MINN. L. REV. 797, 800 (1992) (concluding 
that the hearsay rule no longer seriously contributes in any robust way to substantial 
justice); Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game Theoretic Analysis of 
Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723, 724 (1992) (arguing that the resolution of a hearsay 
dispute is “essentially a matter of deciding who should bear the burden of producing 
the declarant, or . . . how the court should allocate the burden”); Christopher B. 
Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform:  The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 
367, 368 (1992) (acknowledging that “[p]racticing lawyers never tire of talking about 
hearsay and commentators in the academy never tire of reforming it”); Roger Park, 
A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 54 (1987) (arguing 
for a distinction between civil and criminal cases); Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing 
Hearsay:  A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REV. 893, 894 (1992) 
(noting that “[t]he degree of consensus among twentieth-century evidence scholars 
concerning the intellectual bankruptcy of hearsay doctrine is nothing short of 
remarkable.”); I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay:  A Criticism of 
Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (observing 
that the Rules will redeem an important area of procedure from chaos); Eleanor 
Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1341 (1987) 
(arguing that the current hearsay rule “merely glosses over [problems for the trier of 
fact and for the party opponent] by purporting to sort more reliable hearsay from 
less reliable in advance”); Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 
331, 331 (1960) (supporting the Uniform Rules because present evidence rules “fall 
short of providing a satisfactory solution to the hearsay problem”). 
 244. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 374 n.152 (recognizing that “the state of mind 
exception may also be in need of updating in light of modern developments.”). 
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and that the tone and content of the tweet or text demonstrated that 
the declarant remained under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event while texting.245  If such e-hearsay were sent to a friend or 
posted on Twitter or Facebook, a court could also find them to be 
nontestimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.  Thus, 
there is a possibility that uncorroborated social media excited 
utterances could be admitted through Rule 803(2).246  Hearsay 
statements relating declarant’s existing state of mind, motive, intent, 
plan, or emotional, sensory or physical condition covered by Rule 
803(3) seem particularly likely to be made on Twitter or Facebook.247  
One can certainly envision dying declarations delivered via text 
message or tweet.248 
Adding a rigid percipient witness requirement to the present sense 
impression exception will drive litigants to use similar hearsay 
exceptions where the percipient witness requirement cannot be 
satisfied.  The Damper case illustrates this concern.249  In that case, the 
deceased victim’s text, “Can you come over?  Me and Marcus are 
fighting.  I don’t have any gas,” would no longer be an admissible 
present sense impression absent a percipient witness able to vouch 
for the message.250  The prosecution could simply skip next door to 
the excited utterance exception and argue that a “fight” is by 
definition a “startling” event and that the declarant’s excitement was 
reflected in her cry for help and efforts to flee the scene with the aid 
of her friend.251  The prosecution could argue that the use of the 
present tense in the text demonstrated that the exciting event was 
still ongoing and that declarant’s text was sent under the continuing 
stress of the fight.  A court could conceivably accept such an 
                                                 
 245. See State v. Ford, 778 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Neb. 2010) (rejecting challenge to 
admission of text message, “I just got raped . .  By Jake . .  I don’t know what to do!” 
as an excited utterance). 
 246. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).  As discussed with respect to the present sense 
impression above, this possibility also appears unlikely in light of existing evidentiary 
policies and judicial interpretation of the excited utterance.  To the extent that 
courts would be inclined to admit present sense impressions wholly without 
foundation, however, a similar tendency would appear in the context of the excited 
utterance. 
 247. FED. R. EVID. 803(3). 
 248. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (providing a hearsay exception for statements 
made by the declarant about the declarant’s cause of death when the declarant 
believes her death is imminent). 
 249. State v. Damper, 225 P.3d 1148, 1151–52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (holding a 
text message to be nontestimonial because there was nothing to show that the sender 
intended it to be used for later prosecution). 
 250. Id. at 1150. 
 251. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (defining an excited utterance as “[a] statement relating 
to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement that it caused”). 
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argument and allow the excludable present sense impression in 
through the excited utterance back door.252  It makes little sense to 
single out the present sense impression for rigid controls and leave 
the excited utterance untouched, particularly where scholars have 
noted the inferior reliability of excited utterances.253 
Although there will be a large class of cases in which such an 
argument for excitement will be unavailable based upon the 
mundane nature of e-hearsay, this continued avenue of admissibility 
in some cases undermines the utility of the single exception 
amendment at a minimum.254  In addition, it is possible that courts 
and litigants could interpret a single exception amendment as a 
signal of approval for liberal admission of e-hearsay through other 
exceptions.  By negative inference, judges could decide that rule-
makers harbored particular concerns about the reliability of e-present 
sense impressions not raised by e-hearsay offered through other 
exceptions.  Accordingly, judges could freely admit e-hearsay in other 
contexts secure in the understanding that rule-makers had provided 
special safeguards against e-hearsay where such protection was 
necessary. 
To be sure, there are circumstances in which amendment of a 
single hearsay exception is appropriate where a particular policy 
consideration is unique to that exception.255  When the perceived 
need for amendment derives from broad policy concerns that 
promise to touch all hearsay doctrine in some manner, however, an 
isolated review of any one hearsay exception is particularly 
inappropriate.  The age of electronic communication and the Sixth 
Amendment revolution both represent far-reaching paradigm shifts 
that promise to reverberate throughout Article Eight.  Any effort to 
                                                 
 252. Attempts to utilize other hearsay exceptions to avoid rigid limitations in a 
specific exception are common under the Federal Rules.  When Congress imposed a 
strict prohibition within the public records exception on the admission of matters 
observed or factual findings of law enforcement agents, litigants were quick to utilize 
its close cousin, the business records exception, in an effort to avoid the prohibition.  
See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 71 (2d Cir. 1977).  With a strong legislative 
history supporting the public records prohibition as absolute and a constitutional 
component to the prohibition, courts prevented its circumvention through the 
business records exception.  Id. 
 253. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 352 (“If there is no corroboration 
requirement for an inferior species of hearsay [excited utterances], it is nonsense to 
prescribe such a requirement for a superior type of hearsay evidence.”). 
 254. 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8:67, at 567 (“The main utility of 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(1) is in cases where the utterance is clearly contemporaneous but 
nothing startling happened.”). 
 255. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (recently amended to make former one-way 
corroboration requirement for an inculpatory hearsay statement offered by a 
criminal defendant equally applicable to prosecution use of declarations against 
interest). 
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amend the hearsay rules to account for either of these shifts in the 
litigation landscape should involve a comprehensive review of the 
entire structure of Article Eight, rather than a targeted amendment 
to the hearsay exception for present sense impressions. 
C. A “Percipient Witness” Is Not the Answer:  Benefits of Electronic Evidence 
at Trial 
Critics of the present sense impression exception have proposed 
various changes to the Federal Rule.256  One oft-proposed revision, 
recently advocated by Professor Bellin, would require corroboration 
for the present sense impression in the form of a percipient 
witness—“someone who was present at the time the statement was 
made . . . and who ‘received’ (or made) the statement.”257  According 
to Professor Bellin, this percipient witness should be able to “clarify, 
vouch for, and, if necessary, discredit the out-of-court statement.”258  
While such an amendment would certainly eliminate reliability 
concerns regarding the hearsay statement, it promises to undermine 
the value of the present sense impression in the very cases where it 
can be most useful.  Fixing Rule 803(1) by adding a percipient 
witness requirement will serve its purpose, but it comes at too great a 
cost.259 
While proponents of the original present sense impression 
exception may have expected the presence of a percipient witness in 
the typical case, the present sense impression has proved a powerful 
tool in disputed cases where the hearsay declarant is alone or without 
a witness who is able to perceive the described event and relate it to 
the jury at trial.  Even where the witness relating the present sense 
impression is physically present at the time of declarant’s hearsay 
statement, there are circumstances in which that witness is not 
capable of perceiving and corroborating the event in question.  In 
the classic telephone conversation cases, the declarant has a phone 
conversation while the trial witness listens only to the declarant’s side 
                                                 
 256. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 344–54 (chronicling various “judicial 
gloss[es]” added by trial and appellate courts). 
 257. Bellin, supra note 6, at 370; see also Jon Waltz, The Present Sense Impression 
Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay:  Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REV. 869, 884 
(1981) (arguing that legislative history of Rule 803(1) justifies a percipient witness 
requirement). 
 258. Bellin, supra note 6, at 370. 
 259. See People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 373 (N.Y. 1993) (“Insisting that the 
declarant’s descriptions of the events must be corroborated in court by a witness who 
was present with the declarant and who observed the very same events would deprive 
the exception of most, if not all, of its usefulness.”). 
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of the conversation.260  Upon hanging up the telephone, the 
declarant describes the other side of the conversation to the 
witness.261  Finding that the declarant had personal knowledge of the 
full conversation and described that event immediately after 
perceiving it, courts have allowed the physically present witness to 
testify to declarant’s present sense impression regarding the entire 
conversation, even though the trial witness cannot corroborate, 
clarify or discredit declarant’s description.262  Adding a percipient 
witness requirement to Rule 803(1) could exclude statements like 
these reported by even physically present witnesses. 
 In other cases, the present sense impression exception has been 
used to admit declarants’ statements to remote or absent witnesses.  
Sometimes, these statements are made before the occurrence of any 
“startling event,” making the present sense impression the only 
available hearsay exception.263  In the classic case, a victim of 
subsequent violence relates the presence of the defendant to a 
remote witness over the telephone.264  In cases where the witness on 
the other end of the line overhears the arrival of someone, the 
witness has some ability to perceive the event in question.265  Still, that 
witness would not be “equally percipient” and would be unable to 
corroborate or disavow the most important point—the identity of the 
                                                 
 260. See, e.g., Nuttall v. Reading Co., 235 F.2d 546, 551–52 (3d Cir. 1956). 
 261. See United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312, 322–23 (4th Cir. 
1982) (allowing present sense impression describing telephone conversation); 
United States v. Early, 657 F.2d 195, 197–98 (8th Cir. 1981) (admitting evidence of a 
self-reported conclusion about the identity of the person on the other end of a 
phone conversation); Nuttall, 235 F.2d at 551–52 (admitting husband’s hearsay 
characterization of a phone conversation to his wife who only overheard his side of 
the conversation); Knudson v. Director, N.D. Dep’t of Trans., 530 N.W.2d 313, 317 
(N.D. 1995) (explaining the present sense impression exception). 
 262. See, e.g., Nuttall, 235 F.2d at 553 (explaining that contemporaneous 
characterizations of phone conversations are less likely to involve conscious 
misrepresentation). 
 263. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8:67, at 559 (explaining that 
present sense impressions may be more reliable than excited utterances simply 
because the “speaker is not distracted by the pull of an emotional upheaval”). 
 264. See, e.g., Brown v. Tard, 552 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (D.N.J. 1982) (admitting 
statement made in the course of a telephone conversation that “the guy is here to fix 
the air conditioner”); Bray v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Ky. 2005), 
overruled by Padsett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W. 3d 336 (Ky. 2010) (admitting victim’s 
telephone statement to sister in murder trial that defendant was “sitting at the 
bottom of the hill”); State v. Salgado, 974 P.2d 661, 663 (N.M. 1999) (admitting 
murder victim’s greeting, “[h]ey Timo, what’s up,” to visitor shortly before his death 
overheard by telephone witness).  Present sense impressions to remote witnesses 
have been important in other contexts as well.  See State v. Wright, 817 A.2d 600, 605 
(R.I. 2003) (admitting statement over phone by defendant’s mother describing her 
sudden discovery of victim’s purse). 
 265. See Tard, 552 F. Supp. at 1350–51 (admitting evidence when the witness 
overheard the arrival of the air-conditioning repairman over the phone). 
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arriving assailant.  In other cases, the remote witness will have no way 
of perceiving or corroborating the arrival of someone else at all.266  
Where the remote witness can verify that the declarant was describing 
ongoing events within her personal knowledge at the time—who was 
present, near, or arriving—courts have found the present sense 
impression applicable.267  When the subsequent murder of the 
declarant unequivocally supports declarant’s statement that someone 
indeed arrived, these hearsay statements present few reliability 
concerns.268  The present sense impression has also been an 
important source of evidence in 911 cases, after an emergency or 
startling event has arisen.269  In these cases, a remote 911 operator 
cannot corroborate the events described by the caller. 
It is in these cases, where the declarant is isolated at the time of the 
hearsay assertion and dead or otherwise unavailable for trial, that the 
exception has its greatest utility to the adversary process.  As 
described in Part I, the existing framework of the rules guarantees 
significant protection against admission of present sense impressions 
wholly without foundation, even in this context.270  Adding a 
percipient witness requirement to the rule would eliminate the use of 
the exception in cases like these where it can add the most.  Allowing 
the use of a present sense impression only where a percipient witness 
is able to confirm the events related by the hearsay statement would 
mean present sense impressions would only be admitted when they 
were truly superfluous and duplicative of existing live testimony.271  
Although present sense impressions that duplicate live testimony 
could serve to reinforce or emphasize the testimony, a percipient 
                                                 
 266. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 494 A.2d 426, 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) 
(victim’s statements to police over phone not within present sense impression where 
police could not hear corroborating noise in the background). 
 267. See Tard, 552 F. Supp. at 1350–51. 
 268. See Salgado, 974 P.2d at 663 (admitting murder victim’s greeting to visitor, 
which was overheard by telephone witness, shortly before his death). 
 269. See, e.g., United States v. Shoup, 476 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2007) (admitting 
911 report that man with tag number 8549VZ had threatened a caller and was 
carrying a gun); United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(admitting an anonymous caller’s statement to a 911 operator because it was 
nontestimonial); see also People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 373 (N.Y. 1993) (“If 
corroboration by an ‘equally percipient witness’ were required in this case . . . the 
911 tape should not have been admitted. The police who testified to the conditions 
and events at the scene were not present when the calls were made and could not 
have observed the events at the precise moment that they were being described by 
the 911 caller.”). 
 270. See supra Part I.D.2. 
 271. See Brown, 610 N.E.2d at 373 (“If such an eyewitness is available to testify to 
the events, there is certainly no pressing need for the hearsay testimony.”); see also 
Bellin, supra note 6, at 350 (noting that a present sense impression related at trial by 
a percipient witness “merely supplements a witness’s live testimony”). 
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witness requirement will relegate the present sense impression to a 
supporting role. 
While the recent call to amend Rule 803(1) comes in response to 
the rise of social media and other wireless communication 
opportunities, it is important to note that the addition of a percipient 
witness requirement will alter the application of the exception in 
more traditional communication contexts.  A percipient witness 
requirement, ostensibly designed to address unreliable e-hearsay, 
could require the exclusion of present sense impressions even when 
communicated orally.  An amendment designed to deal with 
concerns over technological advancement and the constant churning 
out of tweets, texts and status updates will have an impact on 
previously admissible hearsay that is not the product of the social 
media revolution at all. 
This impact of a percipient witness requirement reveals the 
proposal for what it really is—an attempt to revisit the present sense 
impression exception altogether.  Throughout its history, the present 
sense impression has had detractors who would eliminate it as 
inadequately reliable.272  The social-media revolution has not 
fundamentally altered the operation of the present sense impression 
exception.273  It has simply provided a new and vogue opportunity to 
launch the same criticisms and arguments against its viability that 
have plagued the exception since its recognition. 
Finally, a percipient witness requirement would introduce thorny 
problems of interpretation that would further diminish the value of 
the present sense impression exception.  First, courts would be 
required to decide what level of “perception” was required.  An 
amendment that demanded an “equally percipient witness” would 
involve courts in determining declarant’s perspective, compared to 
that of the percipient witness.  Even a physically present witness may 
have an inferior vantage point and level of personal knowledge than 
the declarant.  Questions regarding equality of perception threaten 
to introduce inconsistency and unpredictability into the application 
of the exception.  Although Professor Bellin suggests that requiring 
equal percipience is “unwarranted,”274 judges and litigants are 
certain to struggle with identifying the optimal level of percipience 
needed to allow the trial witness to vouch for or discredit the present 
sense impression.  An amendment to the present sense impression 
could, as Professor Bellin proposes, endorse trial testimony by a 
                                                 
 272. See supra Part I.B. 
 273. See supra Part I.B. 
 274. Bellin, supra note 6, at 371. 
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“partially percipient witness.”275  Should drafters of a revision 
specifically allow a witness with a lesser opportunity to perceive the 
events in question than the hearsay declarant, courts would be forced 
to grapple with the minimum level of percipience needed to satisfy 
the reliability concerns of the amended exception.  Undoubtedly, 
there is a sliding scale of perception, with some witnesses being as 
percipient as the hearsay declarant, while others will be far less 
percipient.  A percipient witness amendment will require courts and 
litigants to struggle with the array of fact patterns along this 
spectrum, which will introduce inefficient complexities into the 
already labyrinthine world of hearsay exceptions. 
Any proposal to foreclose the use of e-hearsay through a percipient 
witness requirement also overlooks the net positive that the texting 
and tweeting revolution may bring to the trial process.  
Contemporary technology generates and preserves millions of 
hearsay statements each day.276  Rather than crafting rules to rigidly 
exclude such e-hearsay, evidence scholars should consider the 
potential improvements to the adversary process from additional 
electronically preserved information.  The Federal Rules of Evidence 
are designed to ensure that the truth may be ascertained and 
proceedings justly determined.277  The availability of 
contemporaneous information regarding disputed events promises to 
advance the important goal of generating accurate trial outcomes.278  
The Federal Rules of Evidence should be amended to foreclose 
access to such information only when it undermines this goal. 
Because of the proliferation of communication through electronic 
outlets, more hearsay information will be generated and preserved 
for potential use in litigation.279  To the extent that such e-hearsay 
provides previously unavailable insights into disputed factual issues at 
trial, the existence of Facebook status updates and tweets may 
improve the accuracy of trial outcomes.  Imagine the personal injury 
plaintiff seeking damages for permanent physical injuries that 
                                                 
 275. Id. 
 276. Marshall Kirkpatrick, Twitter Hits 50 Million Tweets Per Day; Still Dwarfed by 
Facebook & YouTube, READWRITEWEB (Feb. 22, 2010) http://www.readwriteweb.com/ 
archives/twitter_hits_50_million_tweets_per_day_remains_dwa.php (comparing 
number of messages, posts, and videos that are added to the various social-media 
outlets). 
 277. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 278. See Seigel, supra note 243, at 896 (“Achieving justice in the context of the 
fact-finding portion of a trial means determining the truth—that is, obtaining an 
accurate, unbiased picture of a historical event.”). 
 279. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 355 (indicating that modern communication 
devices make it more likely that hearsay will be preserved for trial). 
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allegedly diminish her quality of life, who posts photographs of 
herself on Facebook dancing with friends after the date of the 
accident in question.  Contemplate the damaging text messages sent 
between co-conspirators during the pendency of a conspiracy.  
Imagine the defendant in a wrongful death suit arising out of a car 
accident who, seconds before the fatal crash, tweeted: 
@defendant1 
On my way home—OMG traffic! 
 Such admissions are becoming increasingly important in 
contemporary litigation.280  In these examples, e-hearsay unavailable 
before the advent of social media sites like Facebook and Twitter, 
may be instrumental in resolving hotly disputed issues at trial.  Thus, 
the culture of electronic communication and social media promises 
to be a boon to the truth-seeking process by producing and 
preserving information about contested trial issues.281  Of course, the 
present sense impression exception would be unnecessary to the 
admission of the e-hearsay assertions in these hypothetical cases.  The 
admissions doctrine could be used to admit them against the posting 
parties or their co-conspirators—to the extent that a hearsay 
exception was deemed necessary.282 
Imagine, however,  the contemporary social media counterpart to 
the seminal present sense impression in Houston Oxygen Co. v. 
Davis.283  Suppose a passenger in defendant’s car tweets moments 
before a fatal accident: 
                                                 
 280. See, e.g., John G. Browning, Digging for the Digital Dirt:  Discovery and Use of 
Evidence from Social Media Sites, 14 S.M.U. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 465, 465 (2011) 
(explaining that these types of scenarios are occurring more frequently due not only 
to the pervasiveness of social media, but also due to the “legal profession’s eagerness 
to exploit the treasure trove of information to be mined from social networking 
sites”). 
 281. Id. 
 282. For example, the posting of the photograph could be viewed as hearsay to 
the extent that the plaintiff was asserting:  “this is me dancing with my friends on 
November 30, 2011.”  Even so, the admissions doctrine would allow it to be admitted 
against her.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(a).  The tweet by the wrongful death defendant 
would not need to be used for its truth to demonstrate careless behavior.  The fact of 
any tweet while operating a vehicle seconds before the impact could indicate 
negligence, regardless of the content of the tweet.  This could be argued to be true 
even with new voice recognition capabilities given the need to handle the wireless 
device while driving at all.  Cf. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as out-of-court 
statements admitted to “prove the truth of the matter asserted”).  Therefore, this 
tweet would be unlikely to be characterized as hearsay—to the extent that it were so 
treated, the admissions doctrine would also allow it in against the tweeting 
defendant.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(a). 
 283. 161 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1942) (automobile passenger 
referred to another car, saying “they must have been drunk” and “we would find 
them somewhere on the road wrecked if they kept that rate of speed up”). 
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@passenger10 5 minutes ago 
Driving down Gandy in Dan’s black Rover—about to take 
FLIGHT!! 
Admitting this against the defendant who crashed his black Land 
Rover into the plaintiff’s car on Gandy Street moments after this 
tweet, to prove defendant was speeding at the time of the crash, 
would require a hearsay exception.284  Because the tweet is not the 
defendant’s own assertion, it would not be admissible through the 
admissions doctrine.285  If the passenger were available to testify at 
trial and testified in defendant’s favor that he was not speeding at the 
time of the accident, the inconsistent tweet would be admissible to 
impeach the passenger, but would not be admissible as an 
inconsistent statement to prove speeding as it would fail to satisfy the 
oath and prior proceeding requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(1)(A).286  If the passenger died in the accident and was 
unavailable to testify, his tweet would likewise not be admissible 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 804.287 
The present sense impression exception, as currently configured, 
would be an ideal fit, however.  There would certainly be 
independent evidence of the event in question—that defendant’s 
black Land Rover was driving down Gandy Street at the time of the 
tweet—given the collision moments later.  Furthermore, the all-
important timing requirement of the present sense impression 
exception would be satisfied if the time of the tweet was within 
moments of the collision.  The passenger was describing an event—
the speed of the Land Rover—while perceiving it drive down Gandy 
Street.  Where subsequent events demonstrate that the declarant was 
in defendant’s car at the time, the passenger’s personal knowledge of 
the Land Rover’s speed immediately beforehand would be 
established for purposes of the exception.  The use of technology to 
record the e-hearsay may further help to establish this personal 
knowledge requirement as some social media sites are now tracking 
GPS information for log-in locations.288  Indeed, Twitter may be able 
to place the passenger on Gandy Street close to the scene of the 
                                                 
 284. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 285. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(a). 
 286. If the passenger testified for the plaintiff that the defendant was speeding, 
the tweet would not be admissible through current Rule 801(d)(1)(B) unless the 
defendant charged the passenger with an improper motive or recent fabrication.  
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). 
 287. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4). 
 288. See About the Tweet Location Feature, supra note 163 (describing how to 
“selectively add location information to your Tweets”). 
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accident at the time of the tweet, which would further solidify the 
timing and personal knowledge requirements. 
While fairness and reliability clearly weigh in favor of admitting this 
tweet for its truth to resolve a disputed issue at trial, a percipient 
witness amendment to the present sense impression exception would 
eliminate its use absent a witness who could corroborate passenger’s 
tweet about the speed of the Rover.  As the defendant driver would 
be the only likely available percipient witness, such corroboration 
seems unrealistic.  This is but one example of the ways in which e-
hearsay may benefit the trial process by providing juries with new 
sources of information to resolve factual conflicts.  One could argue 
that it would be better to call the passenger to testify at trial to report 
his observation of the black Land Rover to the jury subject to cross-
examination than to rely on this e-present sense impression to help 
resolve a critical issue.  As illustrated above, circumstances will 
certainly arise where live testimony is either unattainable or inferior 
to the contemporaneous observation. 
To be sure, information admitted at trial to aid the truth-seeking 
process must be sufficiently reliable to generate superior results.289  
Therefore, the use of the present sense impression exception to 
admit similar Facebook and Twitter e-hearsay must be accompanied 
by some guarantee of trustworthiness.  As discussed above, trial 
judges carefully scrutinize the requirements of the present sense 
impression and have demonstrated a will to exclude hearsay that fails 
on any score.290  Therefore, e-hearsay admitted as a present sense 
impression under the existing regime enjoys sufficient freedom from 
concerns of memory and reliability to justify its use by the fact-finder.  
That is not to say that all e-present sense impressions on Facebook or 
Twitter are inherently reliable or that the existing present sense 
impression exception could not admit some that are potentially 
flawed.  For example, although the passenger in the earlier example 
had personal knowledge of the general speed at which he was 
traveling, he may not have carefully noted the speed of the vehicle in 
which he was riding before tweeting.  In tweeting “about to take 
FLIGHT,” the passenger may not have been describing the speed of 
the vehicle at all—perhaps he was simply expressing his appreciation 
for the look or ride of the vehicle in Twitter jargon.  The defendant’s 
trial counsel can and should make all of these arguments in response 
to the admission of the tweet.  The jury is free to consider all of these 
                                                 
 289. See Seigel, supra note 243, at 904 (noting that “misinformation can be worse 
than no information at all”). 
 290. See supra Part I.D. 
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potential flaws of the e-hearsay and decide how much weight to give a 
tweet in assigning fault in the case.  Eliminating the tweet from the 
consideration of the fact-finder altogether, however, deprives the trial 
process of potentially helpful information.291 
This debate reflects the age-old discussion as to whether a 
particular evidentiary concern should determine the admissibility of 
an item of evidence or whether the concern should affect only the 
weight given the evidence by the fact-finder.292  Although 
commentators have long criticized jurors’ abilities to discount or 
ignore evidence of questionable reliability, much contemporary 
analysis suggests that jurors may be more perceptive in this regard 
than previously believed.293  In light of the benefits of more, rather 
than less information, to the trial process and the recognition that 
jurors are capable of divining evidentiary weakness with the aid of 
skilled legal advocacy, other areas of evidence doctrine have evolved 
to allow the fact-finder access to information despite its potential 
imperfections.294  Rather than amending evidentiary rules to 
foreclose access to electronically preserved information, therefore, 
rule-makers should consider the positive impact such additional 
evidence may have on the trial process. 
D. Amending the Present Sense Impression:  Alternative Proposals 
For the reasons explored above, a revision of the present sense 
                                                 
 291. See Seigel, supra note 243, at 900–01 (“[T]he accuracy of an inductively 
reasoned conclusion is highly dependent on the amount of information upon which 
it is based.”). 
 292. Indeed, this debate surfaced in the Supreme Court’s most recent Sixth 
Amendment case dealing with hearsay and confrontation rights.  See Williams v. 
Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2265 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (reflecting disagreement 
among Justices as to whether expert witness’ reliance on hearsay information affects 
weight or admissibility of expert testimony). 
 293. See People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 914 (Mich. 1998) (Boyle, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he consequence of such an unfounded and unnecessary 
requirement [of extrinsic corroboration of a present sense impression] is that many 
trustworthy statements would be excluded simply out of adherence to a formula 
premised on an unfounded distrust of the finder of fact.”); see also Mueller, supra 
note 243, at 374 (describing how today’s well-educated jurors are “far more 
discerning than the simple tests courts apply in excluding hearsay”). 
 294. For example, common law prohibitions on the admission of interested party 
testimony were abolished in the Federal Rules of Evidence.  FED. R. EVID. 601 & 
advisory committee’s note.  Rather than exclude relevant testimony by interested 
parties or convicted felons, the Federal Rules of Evidence elected to permit such 
testimony freely, but to allow counsel to impeach testimony by such witnesses—it is 
up to the jury to weigh the credibility of such witnesses and determine whether to 
accept and reject such testimony.  Rather than exclude relevant information that 
could be helpful in resolving a dispute due to reliability concerns, the Federal Rules 
of Evidence chose to allow the evidence and let the jury utilize lay experience with 
human nature in deciding how much weight to give such self-serving testimony. 
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impression exception appears to be ill-advised and, at least, 
premature.  To the extent that concerns mount regarding the 
improvident admission of social-media e-hearsay, however, an 
amendment to the exception that controls for reliability concerns, 
while maintaining the utility of the exception, would be superior to a 
percipient witness requirement.  Four possible alternatives, which 
represent revisions that bring increasingly dramatic change to the 
operation of the present sense impression exception, follow. 
1. Making personal knowledge express 
Although the personal knowledge of the declarant is currently 
required for admission of hearsay through the present sense 
impression exception, the personal knowledge requirement is not 
expressly enumerated in the text of Rule 803(1).295  One way to 
emphasize this guarantor of reliability for trial judges utilizing the 
exception is to list the personal knowledge requirement directly in 
the text of Rule 803.  The recently re-styled Federal Rules of Evidence 
make liberal use of a bullet point format in an effort to make 
interpretation and application of the rules more readily accessible.296  
The drafters could adopt a bullet-point format for Rule 803(1) that 
makes the personal knowledge requirement overt and express.  For 
example, the amended Rule 803(1) could read: 
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, 
regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness: 
(1) Present Sense Impression. 
A statement describing or explaining an event or condition 
Made by a declarant with personal knowledge of the event or 
condition 
Made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. 
Bringing the silent personal knowledge requirement into the body 
of the rule could reinforce its importance and ensure that trial judges 
give adequate consideration to the existing information supporting 
the declarant’s first-hand knowledge before admitting a present sense 
impression. 
As discussed above, however, amending any single hearsay 
exception in isolation threatens unintended collateral consequences 
                                                 
 295. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (requiring personal knowledge of hearsay 
declarants). 
 296. See FED. R. EVID. 101 advisory committee’s note (“Many of the changes in the 
restyled Evidence Rules result from using format to achieve clearer presentations. 
The rules are broken down into constituent parts, using progressively indented 
subparagraphs with headings and substituting vertical for horizontal lists.”). 
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for others.  Adding an express personal knowledge requirement 
within Rule 803(1) only could create negative implications for other 
rules—litigants and trial judges could perceive that the drafters of 
the rules only intended a personal knowledge requirement where 
one was expressly enumerated.  Thus, it would be necessary to amend 
all Rule 803 exceptions to reflect the remaining personal knowledge 
requirement to protect against this statutory construction.  From an 
efficiency standpoint, the amendment could be made to the Rule 803 
preamble to express a personal knowledge requirement applicable to 
all provisions.  What this would add in efficiency, however, it might 
sacrifice in efficacy.  The emphasis on the personal knowledge 
requirement as it applies to the present sense impression could be 
lost by its placement in the generally applicable preamble.  In 
addition, the placement of any such personal knowledge requirement 
within the preamble would need to be drafted to reflect Rule 803 
hearsay exceptions with relaxed or distinct personal knowledge 
requirements, like the business records exception.297 
2. Eliminating “bootstrapping” once and for all 
To the extent that trial judges begin indiscriminately admitting 
social media e-hearsay, there are other alternatives to a percipient 
witness requirement that could bolster the reliability of present sense 
impressions.  The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of 
Evidence could consider adding an “independent evidence” 
requirement to Federal Rule of Evidence 802. 
As discussed above, Rule 104(a) requires a trial judge to decide 
“preliminary questions” concerning the admissibility of evidence.298  
According to the United States Supreme Court, a trial judge must 
find such requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.299  The 
requirements of the hearsay exceptions constitute such preliminary 
questions.  As discussed in Part I, such a preponderance standard 
within Rule 104(a) arguably forecloses use of a hearsay statement 
alone to fulfill the threshold requirements for its own admissibility.300  
Some information independent of the hearsay statement must lend 
support to those threshold requirements before a preponderance 
standard can be satisfied.  Indeed, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
specifically require independent evidence to support the existence of 
                                                 
 297. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (requiring source with personal knowledge, but 
allowing declarants in hearsay chain without such knowledge). 
 298. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 299. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). 
 300. See supra Part I.D.2. 
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the requisite relationship or conspiracy necessary to support 
admissibility of hearsay statements by speaking agents, employees, or 
co-conspirators under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2).301 
To the extent that trial judges begin allowing texts, tweets, or status 
updates to serve as the only evidence of the event in question, the 
timing of the statement, and the personal knowledge of the 
declarant, the Advisory Committee could consider adding the 
independent evidence requirement that currently appears in Rule 
801(d)(2) to the present sense impression exception.302  That 
independent evidence requirement provides some guarantee of the 
innate fairness of admitting employee and co-conspirator hearsay 
against a party through verification of the relationship between the 
declarant and the party.303  Although the Rule 803 exceptions to the 
rule against hearsay are premised upon reliability rather than innate 
fairness, reliability concerns about e-present sense impressions and 
other e-hearsay could be addressed through a similar requirement. 
Such an amendment would require the trial judge to find some 
independent evidence, apart from the e-hearsay statement itself to 
demonstrate the declarant’s personal knowledge of the described 
event or condition, as well as the contemporaneity of the statement.  
This amendment would prevent the admission of wholly 
uncorroborated tweets and Facebook posts like the mischievous 
fictional tweet that could have incriminated Sir Walter Raleigh.304  
Without some independent evidence suggesting that Lord Cobham 
and Sir Walter Raleigh were together at the time of the tweet, the 
tweet could not qualify as a present sense impression.305  Although 
this would not require a “percipient witness” who could verify the 
content of any conversation between the two, it would, at least, 
require some independent evidence placing Lord Cobham with Sir 
Walter Raleigh at the critical time to demonstrate Lord Cobham’s 
personal knowledge of a conversation between the two and the 
timing of the tweet while the conversation was ongoing.  Applying 
                                                 
 301. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
 302. Id. 
 303. See supra Part I.D.2 (describing how the independent evidence requirement 
prevents hearsay statements alone from being used to support their own admissibility 
in the Rule 801(d)(2) context). 
 304. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 305. If this hearsay statement were offered against Sir Walter Raleigh at a criminal 
trial, it would, of course, also have to satisfy the mandate of Crawford v. Washington, as 
well as the hearsay rules.  It remains to be seen whether tweets could ever be 
considered testimonial given the absence of any official law enforcement nexus with 
this mode of communication. But cf. Hossain, supra note 56 (describing 
“CrimePush” as new app available on iTunes to report ongoing crime with the push 
of a button). 
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this proposal to the hypothetical wrongful death case involving the 
black Land Rover above, the proponent of the tweet would have to 
provide the trial judge with some independent evidence—apart from 
the tweet itself—to establish the passenger’s personal knowledge and 
observation of the vehicle at the time of the tweet in order to admit it 
through the present sense impression exception. 
The addition of an independent evidence requirement has several 
advantages over a percipient witness requirement.  As provided by 
Rule 104(a), evidence need not be admissible at trial to aid the trial 
judge in assessing threshold requirements of admissibility.306  
Therefore, an independent evidence requirement would allow a trial 
judge flexibility with respect to the information utilized to establish 
the event at issue, the timing of the statement, and the declarant’s 
personal knowledge.  It would enhance reliability without the rigidity 
of a percipient witness requirement that threatens to undermine the 
utility of the present sense impression in cases where such a witness is 
unavailable or nonexistent.  Although independent evidence would 
be required by the rule, it would be up to the trial judge to determine 
the appropriate quantum of independent evidence to satisfy the 
threshold present sense impression requirements.  Finally, this 
independent evidence requirement is an existing feature of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, with which trial and appellate judges have 
experience that can be brought to bear.  Rather than introducing a 
previously non-existent percipient witness requirement that will 
embroil litigants and trial judges in complex problems of 
interpretation with no useful precedent to guide them, the 
recognized independent evidence requirement could be utilized in 
the context of the present sense impression. 
Drafting such an express independent evidence requirement 
would have to be done with care due to the application of the 
doctrine outside the limited context of the present sense 
impression.307  Perhaps, a revision could be crafted to apply an 
independent evidence requirement throughout Article Eight, 
capturing all hearsay exceptions raising bootstrapping concerns.  
Although there are multiple possibilities for the placement of such an 
amendment, Federal Rule of Evidence 802 seems to represent the 
best location for a broadly applicable independent evidence 
requirement.308  Federal Rule of Evidence 802 currently reads:  
“Hearsay is not admissible unless any of the following provides 
                                                 
 306. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 307. See supra Part III.B (discussing problems with single exception amendments). 
 308. FED. R. EVID. 802. 
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otherwise:  a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by 
the Supreme Court.”309  A second sentence could be added to Rule 
802, providing that: 
In evaluating the admissibility of hearsay, as defined by Rule 
801(c), under these rules, the contents of the hearsay statement 
shall be considered, but are not alone sufficient to establish the 
requirements for admissibility.310 
This amendment would create an independent evidence 
requirement in the application of all hearsay exceptions within 
Article Eight and could ensure that trial judges do not 
indiscriminately admit wholly uncorroborated social media e-hearsay 
without some independent foundation. 
3. Taking a cue from Rule 804(b)(3) 
The present sense impression is not the only hearsay exception to 
raise concerns about reliability.  Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) 
allows hearsay statements that are contrary to an unavailable 
declarant’s interest to be used substantively in a case.311  Although not 
admissible at common law, declarations against a declarant’s penal 
interest or those that may subject the speaker to criminal liability are 
admissible under Rule 804(b)(3).312  Such declarations against penal 
interest were not admissible at common law out of fear that criminal 
defendants would concoct hearsay statements by third parties 
accepting responsibility for their crimes.313  In permitting such 
hearsay statements through Rule 804(b)(3), drafters of the rule 
accounted for this continuing concern with a requirement that such 
statements were not admissible unless “corroborating circumstances 
[] clearly indicate[d] [the] trustworthiness [of the statement].”314  
This hearsay exception was recently amended to make this limitation 
applicable to such declarations against interest offered by the 
                                                 
 309. Id. 
 310. One potential drafting difficulty would arise from the designation of prior 
statements of testifying witnesses and admissions under Rules 801(d)(1) and (2) as 
“not hearsay.” Including the modifier “as defined by Rule 801(c)” could serve to 
signal that even those statements would be covered by the Rule 802 independent 
evidence requirement because statements allowed in through 801(d)(1) and (2) fall 
within the definition of hearsay provided by Rule 801(c). 
 311. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note (“The refusal of the 
common law to concede the adequacy of a penal interest was no doubt indefensible 
in logic . . . .”). 
 314. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
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prosecution, as well as the accused in a criminal case.315 
Adding a similar requirement of clear corroboration to Rule 
803(1) represents another alternative to a percipient witness 
requirement.  This amendment would reflect a significant change in 
the existing requirements for admissibility of a present sense 
impression and would certainly call for exclusion of present sense 
impressions admissible under the previous two proposals.  While an 
amendment requiring clear corroboration would be more stringent 
than existing requirements, it would still allow for more flexibility 
than a rigid percipient witness requirement.316  A trial judge would 
have to find strong corroboration of a present sense impression 
before admitting it, but would be able to draw such corroboration 
from multiple sources and would not be limited to verification by a 
percipient trial witness.317  Like the independent evidence 
requirement explored above, the clear corroboration requirement 
already exists within the framework of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.318  Because trial judges and litigants have experience 
applying this requirement in the context of Rule 804(b)(3), this 
standard could be applied to the present sense impression with ease. 
This amendment might foreclose admissibility of Lord Cobham’s 
tweet, absent any corroboration of the content of the conversation 
between Lord Cobham and Sir Walter Raleigh.319  It would still allow 
the admission of the tweet by the Land Rover passenger in light of 
the subsequent collision involving that vehicle and the passenger’s 
obvious personal knowledge of the speed of the vehicle in which he 
was riding.320  Importantly, it would also likely allow text messages like 
the one admitted in the Damper case, where the defendant admitted 
shooting the victim and corroborated some discussion or 
                                                 
 315. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note (“Rule 804(b)(3) has been 
amended to provide that the corroborating circumstances requirement applies to all 
declarations against penal interest offered in criminal cases.”). 
 316. Professor Bellin rejects the utility of a corroboration amendment to the 
present sense impression because it leaves courts “free to accept virtually anything as 
corroboration.”  See Bellin, supra note 6, at 367 (discussing New York’s approach to 
present sense impressions). 
 317. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8:131, at 200 (“[T]he 
requirement is satisfied by independent evidence that directly or circumstantially 
tends to prove the same points for which the statement is offered.”). 
 318. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B) advisory committee’s notes (“The requirement of 
corroboration should be construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of 
circumventing fabrication.”). 
 319. See supra Part I.D.2. 
 320. See supra text accompanying note 286 (stating that the admission of a 
passenger’s tweet to prove the driver was speeding would require a hearsay 
exception). 
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disagreement with the victim that caused him to reach for his gun.321 
4. Moving the present sense impression to Rule 804 
Another alternative for the amendment of the present sense 
impression exception to protect against the indiscriminate admission 
of e-hearsay would be to transfer the present sense impression 
exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 804.322  This transfer would 
permit the admission of present sense impressions only in the event 
that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial.323  The existing 
requirements of unavailability would control access to a present sense 
impression.324  The current description of the present sense 
impression could be moved to Rule 804(b).325 
This amendment would be consistent with the emphasis on the 
Best Evidence principle that has pervaded evidence scholarship.326  It 
would ensure that litigants do not strategically utilize ambiguous and 
powerful e-hearsay in place of available live testimony that promises 
to supply the fact-finder with superior information about underlying 
events.  If such live testimony could be had, a present sense 
impression exception within Rule 804(b) would not allow the 
hearsay.327  When an available declarant testifies at trial regarding the 
events described by her present sense impression, she could, at least, 
be impeached with the statement to the extent that her testimony is 
inconsistent with the prior statement.  To the extent that her trial 
testimony is consistent with the present sense impression, the witness 
could potentially be rehabilitated with the present sense impression 
following impeachment.  Some present sense impressions may fit 
within the existing hearsay exception under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) for 
prior consistent statements where the declarant testifies.328  Placing 
the present sense impression within Rule 804 would thus preserve the 
                                                 
 321. State v. Damper, 225 P.3d 1148, 1152 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). 
 322. Although Professor Bellin briefly mentions this as a possible alternative to a 
percipient witness requirement, see Bellin, supra note 6, at 373, he rejects it in favor 
of a percipient witness amendment as the optimal fix for the present sense 
impression in the Twitter age, id. at 375. 
 323. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (listing several ways in which a witness can be 
considered unavailable). 
 324. Id. 
 325. Indeed, there is currently an available position within Rule 804(b)(5) where 
the present sense impression could fit.  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5). 
 326. See, e.g., Seigel, supra note 243, at 904 n.39 (“[T]he best evidence rule 
permits alternative evidence to be offered when the best evidence is unavailable.”). 
 327. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(requiring unavailability of a declarant for purposes of 
the Rule 804 hearsay exceptions). 
 328. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (allowing for the substantive use of a prior 
consistent statement where the witness has been charged with recent fabrication or 
improper motive or influence). 
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strong preference for trial testimony over hearsay, without 
eliminating the present sense impression from consideration entirely. 
Where such live testimony is truly unavailable within the meaning 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a), however, the present sense 
impression could provide important information that would 
otherwise be lost to the trial process with a percipient witness 
amendment.  Rather than excluding evidence because alternative 
evidence is inaccessible (a percipient witness), an unavailability 
requirement would admit evidence when it is most needed—when 
alternative information is unattainable.  Indeed, an amendment that 
favors admissibility in the absence of alternative avenues of proof is 
more consistent with underlying values in the Federal Rules 
framework, like those found in the ubiquitous Rule 403.329  The 
existing requirements for the admission of present sense impressions 
would provide adequate insurance that e-hearsay is free from the risks 
of faulty memory and mendacity to justify their admission when the 
declarant is unavailable. 
This amendment would also foreclose use of the present sense 
impression of Lord Cobham, where he was famously available but not 
brought to confront Sir Walter Raleigh.330  To the extent that the 
passenger in the hypothetical wrongful death scenario described 
above was alive and available to testify, his present sense impression 
would also be excluded, but could be used to impeach any testimony 
contrary to his tweet.331  Importantly, in domestic violence cases and 
murder cases like Damper, where the victim is unavailable to testify, 
the present sense impression would not be lost to the trial process.332 
Eliminating the present sense impression exception as it currently 
stands in Rule 803(1) and moving it to Rule 804 has significant 
drawbacks, however.  One of the fundamental reasons for the 
existence of the present sense impression is the potential for such 
hearsay statements to provide information that is actually superior to 
live testimony.333  Because the statements describe underlying events 
or conditions contemporaneously, they do not suffer from the 
problems of faulty or reconstructed memory that often plague trial 
                                                 
 329. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 330. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 336. 
 331. See supra text accompanying note 280 (presenting a scenario where a tweet 
about the traffic was admitted in wrongful death litigation). 
 332. See State v. Damper, 225 P.3d 1148, 1153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) 
(authenticating a text message through the use of testimony and circumstantial 
evidence). 
 333. See United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasizing 
the importance of the caller “speaking about the events as they were actually 
happening, rather than describ[ing] past events” (internal citations omitted)). 
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testimony given months or years after the events in question.  
Further, the contemporaneous nature of the assertions and 
observations can sometimes alleviate possible changes in witness 
incentives that intervene between events at issue and the trial process.  
Allowing present sense impressions to be admitted only when the 
declarant is unavailable ignores their potential superiority over live 
testimony even when the declarant is available.  Thus, although it is 
preferable to a percipient witness amendment, transferring the 
present sense impression exception to Rule 804 would result in a net 
loss of evidence available to resolve trial disputes. 
CONCLUSION 
It is, without doubt, the height of fashion to suggest changes to 
long-standing legal principles to adapt to contemporary 
communication norms.  While vigilance is important to ensure that 
modern technology does not undermine traditional legal protections, 
not all doctrine is equally susceptible to transformation by the 
technological revolution.  Because the hearsay doctrine has proved 
equal to the task of regulating human communication in all of its 
evolving formats, it represents one area that need not be overhauled 
to adjust to the contemporary culture of communication.  
Specifically, the present sense impression exception is capable of 
controlling admission of this emerging brand of e-hearsay.  As 
described by this article, e-present sense impressions may add new 
value to the trial process.  As such, proposals to undermine the 
exception by imposing a rigid percipient witness requirement should 
be viewed with caution.  As the technological e-hearsay revolution 
races forward, we need not charge in to “do something,” but may 
safely elect to “stand” by and allow judges and litigants to adapt using 
existing evidentiary rules. 
